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Over the last two decades, Southeast and East Asian developing
countries have evolved into an economic growth pole of increas-
ingly global importance. The pronounced trade orientation of the
eight major countries - i.e. the ASEAN countries, Hong Kong, the
Republic of Korea and Taiwan - has rendered their combined import
volume larger than that of the Middle East, Africa or Latin Amer-
ica. In 1984, 8.7 per cent of total OECD countries' exports
(without intra-EEC trade) went to this region, up from 5.2 per
cent in 1970. In relation to European standards, the imports of
these eight countries are substantial. They were equivalent to
51.4 per cent of external EEC imports in 1984. Against this back-
ground, the declining role of European companies in this region
deserves attention. The losing out of European companies in this
region may be seen at different levels. Table 1 compares the
eight countries' total imports with EEC exports to the region.
EEC exports declined steadily from 12.0 per cent in 1975 to 8.9
per cent of the region's imports in 1984. Interestingly, the
export share of the other two major OECD economies Japan and the
*
This paper reports research undertaken by the author for a
project on "Determinants of the Different Success of European,
Japanese, and United States Companies in ASEAN Countries" car-
ried out at the Kiel Institute with financial support by the VW
Foundation. Comments by U. Hiemenz and R.J. Langhammer are
gratefully acknowledged.- 2 -
United States declined, as well. This was partly related to the
second oil price shock in 1979 and partly to the growing impor-
tance of South-South trade for the region. European exports to
the region, however, exhibited a significantly poorer performance
in recent years than those from the United States and Japan. This
is most obvious from a comparison of growth rates (see Table 2).
Whereas European exports grew at an annual average of nearly one
third in the first half of the 1970s, thereby surpassing both the
region's import growth and the export growth of the United States
and Japan, the growth momentum decreased notably in the second
half of the 1970s and dwindled to 1.7 per cent per annum in the
beginning of the 1980s. In sum, the recent European export per-
formance in the countries under review was poor in comparison to
earlier years, to Japanese or United States exports and to the
region's import growth. Europe's declining importance in the
region is confirmed by an analysis of OECD exports of advanced
industrial goods to the ASEAN countries as well as by an exam-
ination of the share of European companies in foreign investment
2 flows to the region'.
A declining share of imports from Europe is not a unique phenom-
enon of Southeast Asia. The EEC's share in total OECD exports
(excluding intra-EEC trade), for instance, diminished from 34.9
Rolf J. Langhammer, Ulrich Hiemenz, Declining Competitiveness
of EC Suppliers in ASEAN Countries: Singular Case or Svmptom,
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. XXIV (forthcoming).
2
See for instance F. von Kirchbach, 'Transnational corporations
in the ASEAN region: a survey of major issues', in: Economic
Bulletin for Asia and the Pacific, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1, June
1982, pp. 12-27.- 3 -
Table 1 - Imports of Southeast and East Asian Developing Countries and Exports of Selected



























































































































































Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Yearbook 1985;
OECD, Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade, various issues; Council for Economic
Planning and Development, Republic of China, Taiwan Statistical Data Book, var-
ious issues.
Table 2 - Annual Growth of Imports of Southeast and East Asian
Developing Countries and Exports of Selected OECD Coun-
tries to this Region (per cent per annum)
Imports of eight coun-
tries under review




















Sources: as for Table 1- 4 -
per cent in 1980 to 30.3 per cent in 1984, compared to an in-
crease in Japan's share from 14.6 to 18.5 per cent and a marginal
decline for the United States from 24.9 to 23.9 per cent . Yet,
developing Southeast and East Asian countries are in many wavs an
ideal testing ground for the competitive positions of EEC, Japa-
nese and United States companies. First, the region's imports
from industrialized countries were more evenly distributed among
EEC, Japanese and United States companies than African and Latin
American imports, where European and United States companies,
respectively, continued to hold a dominant position. This bears
witness to the comparatively open character of Southeast and East
Asian economies in recent history. Second, this region is an
interesting study ground for the success of Japanese companies.
While the latter were late-comers in this region in comparison to
European and United States companies, Southeast and East Asia was
the region, in which Japan's overseas expansion began. The analy-
sis of the competitive rivalries between Japanese and Western
companies in Asia appears to be particularly relevant in view of
the still small but rapidly growing presence of Japanese compa-
nies in Latin American and African countries.
Whereas the empirical indicators on Europe's declining role in
Southeast and East Asia are rather unambiguous, the underlying
determinants are less obvious. There are numerous possible ex-
planations for this trend, and undoubtedly, it has been a com-
bination of different factors that has led to the present situ-
Same sources as for Table 1.- 5 -
ation. Yet, historical and cultural factors can be largely dis-
carded. First, historical links should have favoured European
companies in at least five of the eight countries. While it is
true, that the EEC share in Thai imports is lower than in total
ASEAN imports, and significantly lower in the Republic of Korea
and Taiwan than in all other countries of the region, the de-
clining EEC share in imports holds true for all countries. Sec-
ond, the geographical proximity of Japan should not be equated
with cultural affinity. In fact, the normalization of relations
between Japan and Southeast and East Asian countries after World-
war^ II took a long time, not only at the political level, but
also economically as the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia with
their wide-spread control over the economies had been most se-
riously affected during the Japanese occupation.
If historical, cultural and other non-economic factors are ex-
cluded, the determinants of the different success of European,
Japanese and United States companies in the region under review
have to be associated with differences in competitive advantages





With respect to the latter area transport costs were not found to
be important disadvantages of European and US suppliers vis-a-vis
Japanese suppliers . This paper takes a closer look at the mar-
See Rolf J. Langhammer, On the Importance of Transport Costs in
International Trade Flows - An Analysis of European, Japanese
and US Exports to the Philippines, Kiel Working Papers, No.
247, November 1985.- 6 -
keting side. Two prima-facie considerations render this approach
particularly interesting:
First, export marketing and distribution strategies are likely to
be an important determinant for the success of any exporter. This
can be gathered, for instance, from the considerable value added
in final distribution of exports in the target market. A ques-
tionnaire survey of foreign trading companies in four Asian coun-
tries suggested, for example, that marketing and distribution
costs of imported products in the final market amounted to as
much as 27 per cent of the final user's price for machinery and
engineering equipment, 36 per cent for chemicals, 51 per cent for
medical supply and 53 per cent for non-durable consumer goods .
As a matter of fact, actual production costs are smaller than
marketing and distribution costs for numerous products. It fol-
lows, that comparative advantages of exporters in marketing and
distribution may be just as important as those in the sphere of
production. This holds true in particular for industries which
are vertically integrated down to the distribution level.
Second, there appear to be at least five characteristics common
to the eight countries under review, which further augment the
importance of marketing and distribution strategies as deter-
minant for the success of exporters:
See ESCAP/UNCTC Joint Unit on Transnational Corporations,
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the
Pacific, Transnational Trading Corporations in Selected Asian
and Pacific Countries, ST/ESCAP/327, Bangkok, 1985, Table 56.- 7 -
Governments intervene massively in practically all economies
under review. Numerous policies and regulations affect the
selection of export channels. This is most obvious for the
choice of overseas manufacturers between direct exports and
local assembly or production. As a result the success of cor-
porate marketing strategies hinges upon their adaptation to the
policy framework in the final market.
Asian product markets are highly segmented owing to the unequal
distribution of income of consumers as well as firms. The posi-
tioning of products within a particular market is therefore of
utmost importance. Marketing and distribution channels have to
be chosen accordingly in order to be effective.
Long-term company and personal relations play an outstanding
role. The importance of personal rather than functional rel-
ations requires long-term commitments for the establishment of
distribution channels.
Brand consciousness is pronounced not only for Westernized
local elites, but also in low-price market segments, where
consumers can hardly take the risk of switching to unknown
brands. This underscores the importance of marketing.
More generally, the markets of Southeast and East Asian devel-
oping countries are no longer open markets in the sense of
sellers
1 markets. This holds true across the board for consum-
er, intermediate and capital goods imports. Competition is- 8 -
stiff, as Japanese, United States, European and other Asian
suppliers vie among each other and with local companies for
future market shares. Marketing strategies figure in the fore-
front of this competition.
One may conclude, that marketing strategies in the broad sense
are likely to influence the success of foreign companies in the
eight Asian markets under review. In connection with the declin-
ing share of European companies in Asian imports, the two follow-
ing central questions emerge:
- Are there any significant differences between the export and
marketing strategies of European, United States, Japanese and
other Asian manufacturers supplying the countries under review?
If yes, what is the background to these differences?
- If there are any significant differences, to what extent do
they lend themselves as explanation for the declining role of
European companies in Southeast and East Asian markets?
This paper seeks to shed light on these questions. After review-
ing the sources of data used in this study in the next section,
it examines two major aspects of the marketing strategies of
companies exporting to the countries under review. The first one
relates to the institutional organisation of the export channel.
The options available vary from sporadic exports upon request
only to investment in assembly or production facilities in the
final market. This choice requires primarily a decision of the
exporter on the amount of resources he is prepared to invest in- 9 -
the distribution channel. One may distinguish the following six
alternatives for penetrating Asian markets:
1. sporadic exports to Asia without any representative or agent
! in the region;
i
2. appointment of a trading company from the home countrv or
region of the exporter as agent in Asia;.
3. appointment of an Asian trading company as importer and dis-
tributor;
4. establishment of a marketing affiliate in Asia;
5. establishment of assembly or production facilities in Asia;
6. licensing of Asian manufacturing companies.
Channels 1. to 5. are put into an order of increasing costs re-
quired to set up export governance structures . Section 3 of this
paper examines whether European, United States and Japanese ex-
porters rely to varying degrees on these different channels and
to what extent this could be related to their success in the
2
Asian markets under review . Section 4 reviews a second major pa-
See also T.W. Roehl, P.L. Chee and Kang Rae Cho, Patterns in
Asia-Pacific trading structures: testing marketing and trans-
actions cost approaches, in: Research in international business
and finance, Vol. 4 (Part B) , (JAI Press Inc., London) 1984,
pp. 67-118.
2
By taking a regional perspective, this paper focuses on the
characteristics of European, Japanese and United States compa-
nies in the entire region rather than on the differences be-
tween various countries in the region or differences between
companies from various European nations. While the author is
aware of the differences in economic development throughout the
region, the existing similarities do permit the proposed anal-
ytical clustering of countries. In fact, this approach comes
closest to the corporate perspective of the region.- 10 -
rameter of export marketing strategies, namely the positioning
and pricing of products in the final market. The major results
and conclusions are summarized in section 5.
2. Data Sources
There is hardly any readily available data to answer the above
questions. This paper therefore employs a new approach towards
analysing the institutional patterns of international trade,
referred to as trade channel analysis . In addition, it draws on
the results of a recent questionnaire survey of the author on
foreign trading companies operating in Asia.
The trade channel analysis basically reclassifies foreign trade
statistics by types of traders using the original customs decla-
ration for all export and import transactions. This technique
allows to calculate the involvement of different types of traders
in exports and imports for each product. In addition, a number of
trader-specific characteristics can be derived, such as average
export and import prices, product and geographical specializa-
tions and average size of transactions. So far, full-fledged
trade channel analyses have been undertaken for Thai foreign
trade in 1980 and for Sri Lankan foreign trade in 1976, 1978 and
The concept of the trade channel analysis was developed in
connection with research on transnational trading corporations,
which the author carried out for the ESCAP/UNCTC Joint Unit on
Transnational Corporations, United Nations Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok.- 11 -
1981
1.
In the context of the present paper, the Thai case is particular-
ly interesting. As Thailand has never been under colonial rule,
European, American, Japanese and other Asian companies have com-
peted on a more equal footing than in practically all other coun-
tries in the region. Moreover, government intervention has been
fairly limited in Thailand. There are hardly any regulations
distorting the choice of import channels, with the exception of
tariff protection of the domestic market and the Alien Business
Law of 1972, which bars majority-owned foreign companies from
retailing and from commission trade. Foreign companies have
swiftly reacted to the latter regulation by establishing affil-
2
iates with local capital majority but under their firm control .
In sum, the structure of import and distribution channels in
Thailand is likely to yield a fairly undistorted picture of the
behaviour and preferences of foreign companies with respect to
their marketing strategies.
For the purpose of this paper, importers were classified into the
following six categories or trade channels
1. foreign-affiliated agency houses with 30 per cent or more
foreign equity participation, excluding the Japanese trading
companies (n = 23);
Trade channel analyses are presently undertaken for several
other countries within a research project of the International
Trade Centre UNCTAD/GATT.
2
In the analysis, these dummy firms have been considered as part
of their parent companies.- 12 -
2. Japanese trading companies and other Asian trading companies
(n = 13) ;
3. marketing affiliates of foreign manufacturing companies, which
have 30 per cent or more foreign equity (n = 49);
4. locally-owned trading companies with less than 30 per cent
foreign equity (n = 57);
5. foreign-affiliated manufacturing companies with 30 per cent or
more foreign equity (n = 132);
6. locally-owned manufacturing (and major service) companies with
less than 30 per cent foreign equity (n = 80).
The actual classification was dones in three steps. First, a list
of the 1 000 largest importers in 1980 was prepared. Concentra-
tion was pronounced with the 10 largest importers handling 33.8
per cent of all imports, the top 100 importers 63.8 per cent and
the top 1 000 slightly below 75 per cent . Second, it was at-
2
tempted to classify each of the 300 largest importers . Third,
all other foreign companies were selected from the group of the
1 000 largest importers and classified by trade channel. As a re-
sult, one can safely assume that all major foreign-affiliated
companies involved in Thai imports are captured in channels 1, 2,
Interestingly, exports of the top exporters were less concen-
trated up to the largest 200 exporters where the pattern re-
versed and exports were more concentrated than imports.
2
Information required for the classification of companies was
collected from Chamber of Commerce publications, lists of the
Bank of Thailand and the Board of Investment, company directo-
ries, various talks with industry insiders and, finally, direct
telephone contacts with the companies. All but 23 companies
could be identified and classified.BihMothek dm
ffl? Weltwirts&aft Kiel
- 13 -
3 and 5 and that practically all importers which were not classi-
fied were locally-owned trading or manufacturing companies .
Based on this classification, commodity tables were calculated
for 144 import products primarily at the four-digit level of the
2
CCCN-code . These 144 products accounted for 80.2 per cent of
total Thai imports in 1980. The commodity tables specified for
the imports of each of the 144 products and for each trade chan-
nel the amount and share of imports, the number of companies
actively involved in each channel, the average import price for
each channel and a break-down of value and average price of im-
ports by four regions of origin, namely the EEC , the United
4
States, Japan and other Asian countries (see Annex table 2 for
an example of a commodity table).
It should be noted, that customs data refer to the actual import-
ers or own business, only, and does not indicate whether commis-
sion agents have been involved. For this reason, the activities
of the Japanese trading companies, which are primarily involved
in commission business, are not adequately captured by the trade
channel analysis. This difficulty is, however, largely remedied
Practically all companies, for which ownership and major line
of business were difficult to establish turned out to be pri-
vate locally-owned trading or manufacturing companies.
2
See Annex table 1 for a list of products included. For a number
of products, customs statistics gave different units such as
weight or volume with the effect that there was a total of 190
print-outs for the 144 products.
Including Belgium, Denmark, the F.R.G., France, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
4
Including the four other ASEAN countries, the Republic of Ko-
rea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri
Lanka.- 14 -
by the results of an interview survey of 132 foreign trading
companies in the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Thai-
land, which included the nine sogo shosha affiliates in Thailand.
A list of companies interviewed is given in Annex table 3. Inter-
views based on a standard questionnaire took place in 1982.
3. Differences in distribution channels between European, Japa-
nese and United States exports
This section examines the quantitative importance of the six
above-mentioned marketing channels in imports of the countries
under review and analyses, whether there are any differences in
the distribution channels for imports from Europe, the United
States, Japan and - as far as data permit - from other Asian
countries.
3.1. Sporadic exports to Asia without any permanent representa-
tion
Entering or operating in Asian markets exclusively from an ex-
porter's sales department without any permanent representative in
the target market would appear to be the least costlv approach
from the point of view of the exporter. However, this approach
has become increasingly difficult and rare. For most products,
this is related to the initially low slope of the sales response
function (relationship between marketing efforts over time and
demand). This relationship implies that market entry initially
requires a substantial amount of marketing efforts. Only beyond a
certain threshhold value does demand respond more elastically to- 15 -
additional marketing efforts. This shape of the sales-response
function is due to the above-mentioned reasons, which make mar-
keting and distribution strategies a key factor for the success
of exporters, i.e. government interventions, market segmentation,
importance of long-term personal relations, brand consciousness
and general competitiveness of markets. As a result, direct sell-
ing without any permanent representative plays a minor role for
OECD exports to the region. Exceptions can be found only for
purchases of raw materials and intermediate goods at early stages
of processing .
Against this background, it would be particularly interesting to
find out whether European exporters have been less inclined to
establish themselves in the target markets than exporters from
other OECD countries. While the review of the institutionally
more complex export and distribution channels in the following
sections suggests that this is the case, it is extremely diffi-
cult to prove this point directly. In the absence of more compre-
hensive data, the following exercise is worth mentioning. Table 3
gives a break-down by nationality of all foreign suppliers repre-
sented in the Republic of Korea. It shows that there were approx-
imately the same number of suppliers from Europe, Japan and the
United States, these companies accounting for 86.6 per cent of
suppliers from all over the World. Relating the number of sup-
pliers from a particular country to exports of this country to
all developing countries and to the Republic of Korea yields two
For details, see Appendix A.- 16 -
Table 3 - Number of Overseas Suppliers Represented in the Republic of Korea by Countries
of Origin, 1981
Europe Japan United States Total
0
No. of overseas sup-
pliers represented
in the Republic of
Korea
Imports of the Re-
public of Korea
(US$ million)
























Source: Association of Foreign Trading Agents of Korea, 'How to export to Korea
1, undated;
United Nations, UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics,
Supplement 1984, New York 1984.- 17 -
interesting points. If one considers total exports to developing
countries as a general indicator for the exporting country's
competitiveness in the Third World, the number of European sup-
pliers represented in the Republic of Korea compared to total
European exports to developing countries was significantly below
the corresponding ratios for the United States and Japan (see
line 5 in Table 3) . Assuming that European exports to developing
countries are not more concentrated in terms of the number of
companies and on products which do not require overseas repre-
sentation, this suggests that European suppliers catering to
Third-World markets have been more reluctant to establish some
kind of representation in the Korean market than their United
States and Japanese competitors. On the other hand, Korean im-
ports per overseas supplier were substantially lower for imports
from Europe than for imports from Japan and the United States.
This points to the overall competitive position of European sup-
pliers on the Korean market.
3.2. Foreign trading companies
The role of foreign trading companies in exports to Asia deserves
particular attention in the context of this paper. Eirst, from
the exporter's perspective the appointment of a trading company
from his home country or region as distributor is the most simple
and least costly way of establishing a permanent representation
in Asia. Second, trading companies tend to function as general
business intermediaries facilitating trade, investment and tech-- 18 -
nology flows. In view of their involvement in various sectors and
their experience with numerous products and companies, they tend
to hold a key position in the economic relations between their
home country and their host countries. Third, there are vast
differences between European, Japanese, United States and other
Asian trading companies. Fourth, the importance of the European
trading houses in Asian economies has notably declined, as will
be seen in the next section. It follows that a thorough analysis
of foreign trading companies is called for when trying to ex-
plain the differences in success between European, Japanese and
United States companies in the rapidly growing Asian economies.
3.2.1 European agency houses
European agency houses have historically evolved as the central
economic link between the colonial powers and their colonies.
Their core activity has been the import and distribution of final
goods and services from non-affiliated principals. They typically
administer a portfolio of distributorship contracts, which grant
them exclusive marketing rights for the products of their princi-
pals. Many of them were established by individual merchants in
the last century, and often the headquarters moved to Europe only
after many years of successful operations in Asia.
The European agency houses have been most active in those coun-
tries of the region which were under European colonial rule. This
is most obvious in Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore. In Hong- 19 -
Kong, the major "hongs" Jardine Matheson, Swire Group and Hutchi-
son Whampoa, all of which are affiliated with British interests
and management, continue to wield considerable influence over the
Hong Kong economy, particularly in view of the extremely diversi-
fied nature of their activities. In Malaysia, Singapore and Bru-
nei, as well, British companies have played the lead role among
the European agency houses. They include the numerous subsid-
iaries of the extended Inchcape groups, which is likely to be the
world's largest independent agency house . In Indonesia, the most
important agency houses used to be the Dutch trading companies
Borneo Sumatra Trading, Internatio, Jacobsen v/d Berg, Lindeteves
and Molucse Trading Co. While foreign companies are no longer
permitted to engage in pure import and distribution activities,
some of the Dutch trading houses have found niches in which they
continue to be active in trade-related activities. In Thailand,
the Swiss agency houses Diethelm and Ziillig are in a strong posi-
tion, in addition to a number of British and German agency
houses. United States agency houses and traders used to play an
important role in the Philippines but they no longer do, because
of rapid, and partly Government-fostered indigenization of import
and distribution activities. Throughout the ASEAN region, the
large Danish trading and shipping house East Asiatic Co. has
sizeable interests. European agency houses are clearly less ac-
tive in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan. For one thing, there
Inchcape subsidiaries market the products of some 2 500 princi-
pals in more than 60 countries. Its 1981 turnover exceeded US$
3 billion. See, for instance, Far Eastern Economic Review, 9
August 1984, pp. 50-56.- 20 -
was no European colonial umbrella under which European companies
could have moved in under preferential conditions and at an early
stage. In addition, comparatively well-developed local entrepre-
neurship and rapid industrialization rendered these two countries
less attractive and accessible to European agency houses. Only
the leading companies such as East Asiatic, Jardine Matheson and
some German agency houses specializing in machinery and plant
exports developed fairly strong positions in these two coun-
tries .
What is common to all agency houses is the primary orientation of
each affiliate to the final market. Agency houses tend to be
fairly independent of their headquarters, and geographical and
product diversification has been less essential to survival than
their country-specific experience. The agency houses' intimate
Owing to the long history of European agency houses in Asia and
their flexibility in responding to new opportunities and re-
strictions, different types of agency houses have emerged. One
may discern at least three different lines of development.
First, there are the large traditional agency houses of colo-
nial origin which are well-integrated into a global or at least
regional company network and which are truely general traders
with interest in consumer goods, transportation equipment,
machinery and services. In most cases, they have diversified
into assembly or manufacturing activities, as well. Second,
there are the agency houses specializing in machinery. Most of
the Asian subsidiaries of the Hanseatic export houses from
Hamburg and Bremen fall into this category. Their Asian subsid-
iaries are generally fairly small and keep a low profile. Yet,
they are active in most countries under review. Not only are
they less diversified in terms of products, but also in terms
of functions: they hardly venture into production activities.
Third, there are those numerous European agency houses which
are European only by virtue of the nationality of their major
shareholders and principals, but which are headquartered in
Asia and do not command over an extended company network in
Europe. Some of them have risen to considerable prominence in
particular markets. Examples are Berli Jucker and Grimm in
Bangkok.- 21 -
knowledge of their final markets, in which many of them have been
operating for several decades has been the major asset they have
offered to their principals. Against this background, one would
expect to find many European manufacturers with limited resources
for export marketing appointing agency houses as their distrib-
utors in Asian markets.
A closer investigation shows, however, that the European agency
houses handled in the early 1980's only a very small percentage
of total imports of the countries under review and that this
share was further eroding. In Thailand, the share of the 19 major
agency houses (including three small American ones) was 2.6 per
cent in 1980, according to the questionnaire survey (see table
4). The trade channel analysis confirmed this order of magnitude
indicating that the 23 foreign-affiliated agency houses, figuring
among Thailand's 1 000 top importers, handled 1.8 per cent of
total Thai imports, excluding transactions on commission basis,
which do not enter the customs statistics under the name of the
commission agent (see Annex table 5) . Considering that about 30
per cent of the turn-over of agency houses consists of commission
business (see Annex table 4) the two approaches point to the
same, small share of agency houses in Thai imports. In Malaysia,
the share of 13 agency houses (out of which one was non-European)
in total imports was 2.0 per cent in 1980, and in the Republic of
Korea their share was even lower with 0.8 per cent of total Ko-
rean imports. Although no empirical data was available for Indo-
nesia, the Philippines and Taiwan, factual evidence suggests that
the share of the European agency houses in total imports was even- 22 -
Table 4 - Imports of Major Foreign-affiliated Agency Houses in Selected Asian
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aExcluding the Japanese sogo shosha and other Asian trading companies. - See Annex
table 3 for the list of companies included in the survey. While the samples in the
Republic of Korea and Malaysia include the majority of the major agency houses, the
sample in Thailand includes all major agency houses. Figures include commission business
as well as business on own account.
Source: Interview survey.- 23 -
smaller in these countries. Moreover, imports of the agency
houses have been growing at rates clearly inferior to those of
national import growth. The average annual growth rate of all
agency houses included in the survey and weighted by the size of
each company's imports amounted to 7.4 per cent over the years
from 1975 to 1980, i.e. about one third of import growth at the
national level.
The declining role of European agency houses is clearly not only
the result of the decreasing share of Asian's imports from Eu-
rope. The questionnaire survey suggests that only between 6 and
10 per cent of total imports of the Republic of Korea, Malaysia
and Thailand from Europe were handled by agency houses (see table
4) .
A more detailed picture emerges from the trade channel analysis
of Thai imports in 1980. Annex table 6 gives a break-down of Thai
imports from Europe by type of trader. As far as the involvement
of the 354 major importers in 144 major products was concerned,
16.3 per cent only of Thai imports from the EC were handled by
the agency houses . Only for food and tobacco imports was this
share significantly higher with 72.4 per cent, whereas in the
quantitatively most important product groups chemicals, machinery
Making allowance for the commodity sample of imports (account-
ing for 80.6 per cent of total Thai imports), the share of the
354 major importers in total imports from Europe (i.e. 35.7 per
cent, see Annex table 7) and the average share of commission
business in imports, of agency houses (i.e. 30.5 percent, see
Annex table 4), these 16.3 per cent correspond closely to the
10 per cent share, derived from the questionnaire survev.- 24 -
"and transportation equipment, the shares were 11.9 per cent, 15.2
per cent and 4.1 per cent respectively. It follows that the Euro-
pean agency houses no longer played the leading role as export
channel for European exporters they used to do. Considering the
growth differential between imports of agency houses in Asia and
total Asian imports from Europe, the importance of the European
agency houses as export channel for European manufacturers is
likely to decline further in the future.
In the same line of argument, the questionnaire survey points to
a high degree of competitive pressure for the agency houses.
Company officials of agency houses were asked, which type of
company they considered to be their major competitors. The re-
sults are shown in table 5, column 2. Agency houses were chal-
lenged from at least three different sides, namely local trading
companies, marketing affiliates of foreign manufactures and the
Japanese general trading companies, in addition to competition
among the agency houses themselves.
It was not possible to confirm the observed trend in the home
countries of the agency houses. While it is sometimes argued that
the traditional agency houses face structural adjustment problems
in their European home countries because of the increasing im-
portance of direct trade, the only empirical indicators available
do not support this view . A survey of Hanseatic export houses
Erich Batzer, Rainer Ziegler, Die Aufienhandelsunternehmen in
der Europaischen Gemeinschaft: Funktionen, Strukturen, Wett-
bewerb, IFO Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Miinchen, Novem-
ber 1984.- 25 -
Table 5 - Perceived Major Competitors of Foreign-affiliated Trading Companies in the Re-
public of Korea, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Thailand by Type of Company
a
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Companies were asked to indicate and rank their three most important types of compet-
itors. The top number in each cell shows the frequency with which types of competitors
were mentioned. The weight in brackets gives the average ranking. The most important type
of competitor was given a value of three, the second most important a value of two and the
third most important a value of one. Consequently, a weight of three in the table implies
that all companies considered this type of competitor as the most important one. Converse-
ly, a weight of one means that all companies regarded that type of competitor as the third
most important one.
Source: Interview survey.- 26 -
concluded that these companies handled approximately 10 per cent
of German exports in 1974 and that this share has been of the
same order of magnitude over the past decades. Significantly,
this study estimates that as much as 45 per cent of all German
exports to developing countries were channeled through the Hanse-
atic traders .
It is not clear how to reconcile these figures with the data on
the export markets. The most plausible explanation appears to be
the following factor. As trading companies have traditionally
been most active in servicing marginal markets off the major
commercial routes, their share in imports of the eight advanced
Asian countries under review is likely to be smaller than for all
developing countries. Other explanations could be the six years
of time difference between the two observations and differences
between German agency houses and those from other European coun-
tries. As the Asian data is quite unequivocal, one may conclude
that European agency houses, many of which actually originated in
Asia, faced more difficulties in Asian markets than in other
parts of the Third World.
The reasons behind the declining importance of European agency
houses in Asian imports appear to be manifold:
H. Knoblich, 'Die Bedeutung des hanseatischen Ausfuhrhandels
fur die deutsche Exportwirtschaft
1 in Marktforschung No. 3,
1979, Vol. 23, p. 86.- 27 -
First, there is the geographical diversification of Asian imports
away from European sources, as non-European suppliers became
increasingly competitive. Below-average growth of Asian imports
from Europe clearly affected the agency houses for which Europe
continued to be the most important source of imports. In Thai-
land, for instance, 52.5 per cent of the imports of agency sourc-
ed houses in 1980 came from Europe (see Annex table 8). The ques-
tionnaire survey indicated that the corresponding percentages
were at approximately the same level in Malaysia and, with 87 per
cent, even higher in the Republic of Korea. The negative corre-
lation between the agency houses
1 share in national imports and
the share of imports from Europe in their total imports is plau-
sible. Shifting to more competitive import sources has been one
strategy of many agency houses for participating in the above-
average growth of Asian's imports from non-European sources. In
Thailand, for example, agency houses procured one fifth of their
total imports from countries other than the EC, Japan, the United
States and other Asian developing countries. This included pri-
marily imports from Australia and New Zealand as well as some
imports from the Middle East. Imports from these countries grew
at an above-average rate during the 1970s. Significantly, how-
ever, the agency houses have not been able to participate in the
fastest growing import segment, namely the one from other devel-
oping Asian and Pacific countries. Only 5.6 per cent of the Agen-
cy houses' imports came from these countries, as compared to the
latters' 2 2.8 per cent share in total Thai imports and a growth
rate 50 per cent above national import growth (see Annex table- 28 -
8)
1.
Second, import-substituting industrialization in the region has
reduced the import demand for final consumer goods, which played
a key role in the activities of agency houses. As may be gathered
from table 4, food and beverages and other consumer goods contin-
ued to account each for approximately one fifth of total imports
of the agency houses in Thailand and Malaysia. The share of con-
sumer goods in national imports, however, has declined notably in
all countries under review, amounting to less than 10 per cent of
total imports in all countries except for Hong Kong. While the
majority of the agency houses have been negatively affected by
import substituting industrialization, some trading houses spe-
cializing in machinery and plant exports have greatly benefited
from this development. Cases in point are companies such as
Coutinho Caro and medium-size Hanseatic traders such as Siemssen,
Rieckermann, and lilies. Overall, however, the specialization of
European agency houses on the distribution of finished goods has
_handicaped their growth potential.
Third, agency houses have generally specialized on the top price
segments of their markets (see section 4 of this paper). In view
of the above average growth of demand for standardized goods in
Several European agency houses held distributorship contracts
from Japanese manufacturers. British-owned L.T. Leonowens dis-
tributed Hinomoto light agricultural tractors in Thailand and
Dutch-affiliated Hagemeyer was marketing JVC and KDK electrical
equipment and Olympus cameras in Malaysia. Yet, the share of
the agency houses in total imports from Japan was less than 2
per cent and even smaller for imports from the United States
and from other Asian countries.- 29
the medium and lower-price segments of product markets, this
specialization of the agency houses appears to have been another
hampering factor on their growth.
A fourth, related factor is the below-average size of the agency
houses
1 import transactions. The value of their annual imports by
product was smaller than the average of the top 354 importer in
Thailand for all product groups except for food and tobacco, and
it was significantly smaller than that of private local trading
companies, their major competitors (see Annex table 9). The rel-
atively small size of import transactions is likely to have
further undermined the competitiveness of the agency houses.
Fifth, there are signs that some agency houses had difficulties
in competing with local trading companies and the sogo shosha in
terms of operating costs and margins. According to the survey,
the gross margin of foreign affiliated agency houses in Asia
averaged at 20.1 per cent, compared with 7.1 per cent for sub-
sidiaries of the sogo shosha. While a major portion of this dif-
ferential is due to differences in activities (e.g. product spe-
cialization, share of commission business), a comparison of im-
port transactions by product does suggest that gross margins of
the agency houses have been higher than those of the sogo shosha.
Although there is no systematic evidence, gross margins of the
agency houses are likely to have been higher than those of local
trading companies in view of the more informal character of most
Asian trading companies as well as the lower level of compensa-
tion given to their top executives.
Sales minus costs of sales divided by sales.- 30 -
Taken together, the three last-mentioned factors may also be
interpreted in a different light. They suggest, that European
agency houses in Asia have had a tendency to follow niche strate-
gies by concentrating on their most lucrative agencies and sub-
stituting their own profitability for market expansion of their
principals. There is evidence on each of these points. Not only
the cost component but also the profit part of the gross margins
of agency houses appeared to be higher than those of their com-
petitors.
In Malaysia, for instance, foreign-controlled limited companies
in the wholesale sector accounted for an average share of 34 per
cent of total equity in this sector between 1976 and 1978 but
realized nearly two-thirds of all profits generated by all limit-
2
ed companies in the wholesale sector . Similarly, the 40 foreign-
affiliated companies among the 289 largest wholesalers and re-
tailers in the Philippines owned 16.4 per cent of the total as-
sets and realized 16.4 per cent of total sales of all 289 com-
panies and yet accounted for 46.8 per cent of all net income and
for 50.1 per cent of total income tax provisions of the whole
group .
This excludes the bulk of the transactions of the sogo shosha,
which are done on commission basis.
2
See: Department of Statistics, Government of Malaysia, Report
on the Financial Survey of Limited Companies, various issues.
Mamoru Tsuda, Rigoberto D. Tiglao and Edith S. Atienza, "The
impact of TNCs in the Philippines: a study of major foreign and
foreign-affiliated corporations in the Philippines", University
of the Philippines, Law Center, Quezon City, June 1978, pp. 20,
27, 28, 39, 40, 41.- 31 -
The below-average growth of the agency houses was mentioned
above. As far as the bargaining position of the agency houses in
relation to their principals is concerned, the following factor
worked to the advantage of the former. European principals fre-
quently took a fairly passive stance towards the marketing activ-
ities of their distributors in Asia. The interviews indicated
that representatives of European manufacturers visited their
distributors in Asia far less frequently than Japanese manufac-
turers, for instance. Generally, the agency houses were quite
free in their pricing, promotion and distribution strategies. The
limited supervision of European principals over their distribu-
tors in Asia was also apparent from the very low turn-over rate
of agencies. As a matter of fact, many agency houses have repre-
sented the same principals for several decades. Under these cir-
cumstances, it has been a perfectly rational strategy for any
agency house to assemble a large portfolio of sole distributor-
ship contracts and to sell whatever the market demands without
pushing any particular product. To the extent that product mar-
kets were not very competitive, it was equally rational to ex-
ploit monopolistic advantages by selling at a higher price and a
lower volume than those corresponding to the interest of the
manufacturer. Obviously, this approach worked out better in the
comparatively price- inelastic top-quality segments of demand.
Hence, the declining share of the agency houses in the region's
imports apparently reflects also the business strategies of the
agency houses and their relationship with their principals.- 32 -
A final factor, which has accelerated the relative decline of the
importance of agency houses, are host country policies. With the
exception of the two city states Hong Kong and Singapore, all
other countries under review have enacted laws and regulations
which effectively curtail the activities of foreign trading com-
panies and protect the growth of local traders. As the decline of
the European trading houses is more pronounced than that of other
foreign trading companies, government regulations applying to all
foreign trading companies alike cannot be considered as the domi-
nant factor behind the decreasing role of the agency houses. At
least equally important have been the transition of the Asian
economies in terms of import sources and industrialization pat-
terns as well as company internal characteristics of the agency
houses. As most of these factors are of a secular nature, the
observed trend is unlikely to reverse in the future.
3.2.2. Japanese general trading companies
The term Japanes general trading companies or sogo shosha refers
j
td' Japan's nine largest trading companies Mitsubishi Corp., Mit-
sui & Co., C. Itoh & Co., Marubeni Corp., Sumitomo Corp., Niss-
ho-Iwai Corp., Kanematsu-Gosho, Toyo Menky Kaisha and Nichimen .
They are the world's largest trading companies, handling close to
50 per cent of Japanese foreign trade and approximately 4 per
cent of world trade. They are truely general trading companies,
with subsidiaries all over the world (see table 6), involvement
Sometimes, seven more companies are included, namely Chori
Company, Itoman & Co., Kawasho Corp., Kinsho-Mataichi Corp.,
Nazaki & Co., Okura & Co., and Toshoku.
i
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Source: Japan Foreign Trade Council.- 34 -
in some 20 000 different products and a high degree of functional
diversification. After World war II, they re-emerged in the cen-
tre of Japan's huge industrial and financial conglomerates (Kigyo
Keiretsu) in which they continue to play a lead role as suppliers
of raw materials, marketing arms for final products and as sour-
ces of information and short-term credits . The particular
strength of the sogo shosha lies in large, recurrent trade trans-
actions of standardized goods, characterized by economies of
scale in international trade. Raw materials and intermediate
products are prime examples, whereas the sogo shosha have been
less interested in distributing differentiated consumer goods and
products requiring intensive after-sales services.
The rise of the Japanese economic presence in Southeast and East
Asian developing countries is intimately linked to the operations
of the sogo shosha. Not only do they handle a large share of
Japan's foreign trade in general, but their overseas expansion
2
actually began in Asia and Asia continues to be the region with
the largest number of sogo shosha affiliates in the world (see
also table 6). Moreover, the involvement of the sogo shosha is
the most striking difference when comparing export marketing
strategies of Japanese manufacturers with those of Western ex-
The coherence of these conglomerates is based on management
co-ordination rather than on equity cross-holdings, which actu-
ally declined in recent years. Similarly, the share of intra-
group transactions is rather small with about 15 per cent of
total purchases and 5 per cent of total sales. See Fair Trade
Commission of Japan, cited in a report of the Asian Wall Street
Journal, 13 June 1983.
2
See for example Kunio Yoshihara, Sogo Shosha; The vanguard of
the Japanese economy (Tokyo, Oxford University Press), 1982.- 35 -
porters. The following paragraphs therefore examine the trade and
trade-related activities of the sogo shosha in the eight coun-
tries under review in greater detail.
In order to obtain a rough indication of sogo shosha involvement
in the imports of the eight countries under review, the following
estimation may be useful. Japan's share in the region's imports
is approximately one quarter, of which sogo shosha are likely to
handle about half. The interview survey suggested that third-
country trade of sogo shosha affiliates in the region amounted to
up to one-third of their turnover. This would point to a share of
between 15 and 20 per cent of the sogo shosha in total imports of
the countries under review. The results of the interview survey
confirm this order of magnitude. In the Republic of Korea, 8 out
of 19 Japanese trading companies operating in the country handled
12.5 per cent of total imports in 1980. In Thailand, the nine
sogo shosha and Nomura Trading accounted for 15.1 per cent of all
imports. In Malaysia, where the sogo shosha have been late-com-
ers, the share of the five smaller sogo shosha on which there was
data was at 2.9 per cent only . Estimations on the involvement of
the sogo shosha in Indonesian and Taiwanese foreign trade, on
the other hand, cite figures of substantially more than 20 per
2
cent . As a matter of fact, Indonesia, Hong Kong and Taiwan ap-
United Nations, ESCAP/UNCTC Joint Unit, 1985, loc.cit., section
II D 3.
2
See for instance Max Eli, Die Rolle der japanischen Genralhan-
delshauser (sogo shosha) in Siidostasien, in: H. Laumer (ed.),
Growth Market Southeast Asia, Opportunities for and Risks of
Business Cooperation, IFO Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung
(Munich, Weltforumverlag) 1984, pp. 363-385.- 36 -
parently accounted for close to 50 per cent of total imports
handled by the sogo shosha in developing Asian and Pacific coun-
tries .
These large shares in the region's imports reflected the vast
differences in size between the sogo shosha and the European
agency houses. According to the survey, average annual imports of
sogo shosha affiliates in Asia were with over US$ 200 mill, more
than ten times larger than those of European agency houses (see
Annex table 4) . Many sogo shosha were reportedly not interested
in transactions below US$ 1 million. This size of operation has
permitted the realization of substantial economies of scale. In
turn, operating margins of the sogo shosha have been low, as may
be gathered from table 7.
In contrast to the European agency houses,, final consumer goods
were only of marginal importance in sogo shosha imports to the
region, whereas intermediate goods (steel products and chemicals)
and machinery accounted for the bulk of their imports (see table
8) .
While the growth rates of sogo shosha imports, as well, appeared
to be lower than those of national imports of the countries under
Estimation based on country break-down of 3 sogo shosha, see
United Nations, ESCAP/UNCTC Joint Unit, 1985, loc.cit., table
30.- 37 -
Table 7 - Consolidated Profit and loss Statement of the Six Largest Sogo Shosha and of
their Trading Affiliates in Thailand, 1980/81
(Percentage of Total Trade Transactions)
Total trade transactions
Total trade transactions
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Source; Company income statements.- 38 -
Table 8 - Imports of 21 Affiliates of Japanese Trading Companies in the Republic

























































Source: Survey- 39 -
review , the sogo shosha have not come under the same competitive
pressure as the European agency houses. Table 5, for instance,
shows that the sogo shosha were competing primarily among each
other rather than with other types of companies: all of the sogo
shosha affiliates interviewed considered other sogo shosha to be
among their most important competitors. On a distant second place
came marketing affiliates of manufactures, which points to the
growing concern of the sogo shosha over direct sales by manu-
facturers. Less than half of all sogo shosha affiliates consider-
ed private local trading companies as their competitors, whereas
the latter turned out to be the most important competitors of the
agency houses. As a matter of fact, there were numerous examples
of complementary relations between sogo shosha affiliates and
private local trading companies . Among the local trading compa-
nies, only the large Korean trading conglomerates were beginning
to compete successfully with the sogo shosha.
The weighted annual growth rate 1975 to 1980 of sogo shosha im-
ports was, according to the survey, at 8.2 per cent, which was
slightly higher than that of the agency houses. In some coun-
tries, Japanese-trading companies have recently been forced to
reduce their staff, mainly because of declining bilateral trade
with Japan (Rep. of Korea, Indonesia) . See for example Asian
Wall Street Journal, 15 August 1983.
2
In Thailand, for instance, Mitsubishi transferred some trans-
actions to one of the newly established local trading companies
which faced difficulties in meeting the minimum export volumes
specified by the Thai Board of Investment. Mitsui advised the
Malaysian Government on its programme to establish Malaysian
"sogo shosha". In early 1983, Mitsui actually entered into a
joint venture with private and public partners in Malaysia to
form an international trading company after the model of the
sogo shosha. See Business Day, 28 February 1983, p. 13.- 40 -
The reason behind the complementarity of sogo shosha and local
trading companies in the countries under review relates to the
functional profile of the sogo shosha. Their major strength lies
in the international allocation of buyers and sellers. Although
this is a relatively low value-added activity compared to final
distribution, for instance, it requires vast investments to
establish a world-wide net-work of information and communication.
The international network of the sogo shosha is practically
unrivalled , and it is used to offset a particularly critical
handicap of most Third-World based importers and exporters,
namely limited knowledge of overseas markets. Not surprisingly,
the sogo shosha included in the survey perceived their major
advantage over local trading companies in the area of interna-
tional market surveys (see table 9). This contrasted sharply with
the agency houses which saw their major advantage over local
importers in final marketing and distribution activities.
From the point of view of Japanese export manufacturers and over-
seas investors, the involvement of the sogo shosha has been in-
vited as risk absorbers and in order to tap the sogo shosha's
vast potential of information, experience and connections in the
respective overseas markets as well as their access to financial
Marubeni's 141 overseas offices in 87 countries are linked by
120 leased channels to its three independent switching centres
in Tokyo, New York and Brussels, permitting the transmission of
480 characters per second between any two of its affiliates
within 10 minutes. Competitive bids for large projects can be
assembled in a matter of few hours. For Mitsui, telexing costs
without salaries reportedly amount to 7 per cent of the gross
trade profit. Marubeni, Annual Report, 1982, pp. 36n, company
sources.Table 9 - Perceived Advantages of Foreign Trading Companies over Local Trading Companies in the Republic of Korea,
Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Thailand
a (Number of Responses, Weights in Brackets )
Advantage Survey Identifi- Trans-
of po- cation of porta-
tential buyers tion
markets and sel-
Insur- Trade Credits Market- Size Pric-
ance financ- to ing in of ing
ing sellers final orders
market
Quali- After Total

























































































Company officials were asked to indicate and rank for their major products the three most important functional
areas in which they felt they could perform significantly better than locally owned-trading companies. - The
weights show the average ranking in each cell. The weights range from 1 to 3. A weight of 3 implies that all com-
panies in the corresponding cell considered to have the most important advantage in this particular area. A weight
of 1 implies that all companies perceived their third-most important advantage vis-a-vis local trading companies in
this particular area.
Source; Survey.- 42 -
resources (for details see Appendix B) . This has been of prime
importance for the small and medium size exporters, which could
hardly have ventured abroad on their own. Significantly, Japanese
medium size companies have been able to participate to a much
larger extent in exports to and overseas investment in the eight
countries under review than medium-size companies from the United
States or Europe have done. The availability of the sogo shosha
services as export marketing vehicle has undoubtedly been one of
the major advantages of second-tier manufacturers from Japan over
their Western competitors in Southeast Asian markets.
The same holds true for the other end of the spectrum: the sogo
shosha have proved to be very successful in organizing consortia
for projects too large or too risky for any individual company.
Mention was made of the Asahan project, which created a new for-
mula for the distribution of ownership and risk in mineral re-
source development between the private sector and host and home
governments. Sumitomo has played a lead role in this project. In
a number of cases, government institutions of the countries under
review have turned to the sogo shosha when trying to implement
ambitious projects. Malayawata Steel and Mitsubishi's involvement
in the "Malaysian car" project are cases in point. More general-
ly, the sogo shosha have been the most important organizers of
Japanese plant exports. They handle the bulk of Japan's plant
exports which amounted to approximately US$ 10 billion per annum
in the early 1980s and out of which about one third was exported- 43 -
to developing Asia . Plant exports to the eight countries under
review included power plants, refineries and petrochemical
plants, steel plants and other metal processing facilities, fer-
tilizer plants, cement plants and various processing facilities
for agricultural commodities- such as sugar, pulp and edible
2
oils .
As a matter of fact, the sogo shosha are so well established in
Asian developing countries and the OECD countries that they have
been involved, to a growing extent, in exports from the United
States, Europe and other developing countries to the eight coun-
tries under review. In Thailand, for instance, the sogo shosha
handled 21.2 per cent of all imports from North America in 1980
as well as 6.0 per cent of imports from Australia and New Zea-
land. Their imports from Europe had reached 2.7 per cent of total
imports from Europe and were equivalent to 27.1 per cent of the
agency houses
1 imports from Europe. In the Republic of Korea, the
sogo shosha imports from Europe amounted to 7.4 per cent of total
imports from Europe and clearly exceeded the share of the agency
houses (see table 10) . In contrast to the general notion that
trading companies have a comparative advantage in servicing mar-
ginal markets off the major trading routes, the sogo shosha play-
ed a much larger role in imports from OECD countries than in
those from developing countries. Particularly as far as the
See Ministry of Trade and Industry, Japan, White Paper on Trade
and Commerce, 1982, and Alexander Young, The Sogo Shosha; Ja-
pan's multinational trading companies (Boulder, Col.: Westview
Press), 1979, p. 203.
See annual reports of the sogo shosha.- 44 -
Table 10 - Iitiports of Japanese General Trading Companies in the Republic of




















































Source: Survey- 45 -
thriving intra-Asian trade was concerned, the involvement of the
sogo shosha was surprisingly low.
In sum, the sogo shosha have greatly facilitated the access to
Southeast and East Asian markets for Japanese exporters. They
have functioned as readily available export marketing channels to
large and small manufactures, alike. Their powerful position
within Japan's industrial conglomerates has put them into a
unique position as two-way communicators and organizers, trans-
mitting export opportunities in Asia to potential exporters in
Japan and feeding back to them market acceptance in the final
market and adaptation requirements. Due to their functional di-
versification, the sogo shosha have been able to enhance Japanese
exports to developing Asia, irrespective of the specific organi-
zation of the export marketing channel. Not only have they han-
dled approximately half of Japanese exports to the region, but
they have also been active in linking up Japanese exporters and
local distributors, and they were Japan's largest investors in
the countries under review. Whatever the future role of the sogo
shosha may be in view of the tendency towards direct exports of
Japan's leading manufacturers, the sogo shosha can be credited
with having provided the overseas institutional framework in
which Japanese economic interests in developing Asia have risen,
from an insignificant level after World war II to the present,
leading position.- 46 -
3.2.3. United States trading companies
In contrast to Japan and Europe, there are only comparatively few
international trading companies in the United States, and they
have never come to assume the same importance for the national
economy as trading companies in other Western countries. This has
been due to the following factors. Until recently, foreign trade
played a marginal role for the United States economy. Exports
have traditionally been concentrated in the hands of a small
number of companies: Exports of food items, agricultural raw
materials, fuels, ores and metals , which together accounted for
about 30 per cent of United States exports over the 1970s, have
been handled by the leading transnational corporations in the
primary sector. Similarly, the top industrial companies have
handled the major share of manufactured exports. In 1978, for
instance, 53 per cent of all United States exports came from only
120 manufacturers .
In the eight Asian countries under review, American trading com-
panies are hardly visible. This is in particular true for the
Webb-Pomerene Associations which in any case handle only about
1.5 per cent of United States exports . It applies also to the
SITC groups 1 to 4 plus 67 and 68.
2
D. Bello, N. Williamson, 'The structure of U.S. export chan-
nels: an evaluation" and a proposal for improvement
1, in: M.A.
Harvey, R.F. Lusch (eds.), Marketing channels, domestic and
international perspectives, Centre for Economic and Management
Research, School of Business Administration, The University of
Oklahoma, 1982, p. 106 n.
The Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act of 1918 encouraged the
establishment of common foreign sales organizations in order to
help small and medium size firms. In 1978, only 27 Webb-Pome-
rene Associations were active, ibid.- 47 -
Export Management Companies, which somewhat resemble the European
agency houses. Export Management Companies handle approximately
12 per cent of United States exports. They represent primarily
smaller manufacturers. To the knowledge of the author, however,
they were hardly involved in exports to the eight countries under
review.
Up to the mid 1980s, the same held true for the companies estab-
lished under the new Export Trading Company Act of 1982. Compa-
nies such as General Electric and Sears Roebuck have established
their own separate trading companies with offices in Hong Kong
and Singapore, and they have considerably broadened the scope of
the products they handle . However, they have not yet emerged as
2
a quantitatively important new export channel .
The most visible United States trading companies in developing
Asia are the major commodity traders and a handful of agency
houses . Among the commodity traders, Phibro, Cargill and - to a
lesser extent -Continental Grain and Grover Connell are active
throughout the region. Phibro, the result of the 1981 merger of
Richard Barovick, 'NFTC Conference Spotlights, Export Trading
Companies
1, in: Business America, 18 October 1982, pp. 7-15.
As a matter of fact, the sogo shosha continue to be the United
States largest exporters if one disregards the oil companies.
They reportedly handle an estimated 10 per cent of United
States exports. T. Cappiello, 'The changing role of Japan's
general trading companies', in: Journal of Japanese Trade and
Industry, 4 November 1982, p. 28.
The handful of United States agency houses operating in the re-
gion includes companies such as Woodward and Dickerson, Wilbur-
Ellis/Connel Bros. Co., Muller and Phipps or American Trading.
They have been most active in the marketing of machinery, food,
fertilizers and chemicals. Quantitatively, they account for
only a fraction of the imports of European agency houses.- 48 -
Philipp Brothers and Salomon Brothers, is primarily involved in
the region's exports of metals (tin and copper) and molasses.
Cargill and Continental, figuring among the world's leading grain
traders, export United States grains to the region and have di-
versified into other areas of agri-business. Owing to the high
degree of food self-sufficiency of the countries under review,
however, the United States commodity traders are involved mainly
in primary commodity exports rather than in imports.
In sum, United States exporters interested in developing Asia,
have not been able to rely on United States trading companies as
export vehicle. Japanese trading companies have handled some of
these exports. The bulk of United States exports, however, has
not been channeled through trading companies .
3.3. Appointment of Asian trading companies as importers and
distributors
In line with the dynamic development of service industries in the
countries under review, local import and distribution companies
have multiplied over the last two decades. Asian trading compa-
nies today range from owner-operated back-yard shops to transna-
tional conglomerates. Many of the leading local trading companies,
in Asia exhibit the same type of organizational patterns and
public accountability and apply the same modern management tech-
niques as Western trading companies. This rapid development has
reduced the need for go-betweens linking overseas manufacturers
See table 10 and Annex table 6.- 49 -
and local distributors. As part of the tendency towards reducing
the number of members in export trade channels, manufacturers
from OECD countries have increasingly appointed local trading
companies as their distributors.
One may distinguish three types of local trading companies, which
differ not only in their typical genesis, but also as far as
their relations with OECD-country exporters were concerned.
The largest group of local import and distribution companies in
the countries under review are those of Overseas Chinese proven-
ance. Most of them evolved from small shops specialising in im-
ports from other Asian countries or in wholesaling of standard-
ized products. Others began as rural-based middlemen handling
agricultural (export) commodities. Notwithstanding the lead role
of the Overseas Chinese in the wholesale and retail sectors of
most of the countries under review, only the largest and most
modern Chinese-owned trading companies have become importers and
distributors for manufacturers of developed countries. The bulk
of the Chinese traders continues to specialize in domestic dis-
tribution, primary commodity exports or intra-Asian trade . This
is the major reason, why Japanese and European trading companies
have had difficulties to break into the fast-growing intra-Asian
2 trade . According to the trade channel analysis in Thailand, the
As the bulk of the Chinese trading companies are small, they do
not figure among the 354 importers included in the Thai trade
channel analysis. In consequence, only 36.1 per cent of total
imports from developing Asian and Pacific countries were han-
dled by the 354 top importers compared to 56.7 per cent for
total Thai imports. See Annex table 7.
2
See also Annex table 8.- 50 -
larger Chinese trading companies have been particularly strong in
channeling imports of fertilizers to farmers owing to the strong
position of Chinese middlemen in rural areas, and in supplying
small and medium size Chinese-owned manufacturing units with
inputs (base metals, wood, wood products and paper) and simple
machinery .
A second category of local trading companies has emerged primari-
ly as a result of government promotion and protection. This in-
cludes companies which have thrived on import quotas allocated to
2
them . Others have been promoted under special programmes aimed
at strengthening local trading companies, which have been adopted
by all governments in the region with the exception of Hong Kong
and Indonesia . The limited commercial success of these compa-
nies, if one excludes the Republic of Korea, and their concen-
tration on exports explains why these companies have not become a
major import channel for products from OECD countries.
See Annex table 6.
2
This has played an important role in Indonesia, see Richard
Robison, 'Towards a class analysis of the Indonesian military
bureaucratic state', in: Connell Modern Indonesia Project, No.
25, 1978, pp. 17-39.
3
The Ministry of Commerce and Industry of the Republic of Korea
announced a programme for promoting general trading companies
in April 1975; since 1978, large local trading companies have
been eligible to promotion by the Thai Board of Investment;
Presidential Decree n? 1646 in the Philippines provides privi-
leges to trading firms since 1979; the Government of Singapore
established the International Trading Corporation (Intraco) to
expand export/import business with Eastern Europe; the Govern-
ment of Malaysia has been actively trying to establish trading
companies along the lines of the Japanese sogo shosha; the
Government of Taiwan promoted in 1978 and 1979 the establish-
ment of five locally-owned general trading companies.- 51 -
A third group of locally-owned import and distribution companies
consists of indigenized former agency houses. Throughout the
region, there were numerous companies of colonial origin which
had been taken over by local partners or outside investors. In a
few spectacular cases in Malaysia, host government institutions
staged commercial take-overs. Notwithstanding their changing
ownership patterns, these companies have generally retained or
even increased their portfolio of distributorship contracts.
The share of local trading companies in the region's imports has
reached a significant level. In Malaysia, locally-controlled
limited companies in the wholesale and retail sector handled 13.5
per cent of total imports in 1980, excluding the import activi-
ties of the large number of partnerships and individual proprie-
1 2
torships . In the Republic of Korea, local trading companies
handled as much as 21.5 per cent of total imports in 1981, out of
which 7.4 per cent were done by the Korean general trading compa-
nies . In Thailand, the own-business imports of the 57 largest
local trading companies amounted to 5.0 per cent of total imports
4
in 1980 . If the several thousand smaller local trading companies
were included, the share of local trading companies is likely to
have been at least twice as high. In Indonesia and the Philip-
pines, local trading companies played a major role in national
imports because of restrictions on the activities of foreign-af-
See Annex table 10.
2
General offer agents other than foreign offer agents and offer
agents purchasing for own use.
See Annex table 11.
4
See Annex table 5.- 52 -
filiated companies in wholesaling and retailing and because of
the comparatively advanced development of local entrepreneurship
in the Philippines.
There is reason to believe that the reliance on local importers
and distributors differed significantly between manufacturers
from Europe, Japan and the United States. Japanese companies
appear to have been more prepared to co-operate with local
trading companies in the countries under review than European and
United States manufacturers, and European manufacturers have
probably used local distributors slightly more than United States
companies. There are three different factors which could explain
this difference between Japanese and Western exporters:
- Japanese manufacturers have generally responded more inten-
sively than United States and European firms to the demand in
the large and fast growing transitional and traditional market
segments. Motor cycles and electrical household appliances such
as fans, radios, and TVs are prime examples among consumer
goods. Penetrating these markets required much more of a grass-
root level sales organisation than concentrating on the compar-
atively small urban demand for prestigious consumption goods
and state-of-the-art technology.
- The presence of the sogo shosho greatly facilitated the identi-
fication of suitable Asian importers and distributors and the
monitoring of their activities. To the extent that the sogo
shosha were involved as commission agents, Japanese exporters
had powerful agents at their disposal to monitor the perfor-
mance of their Asian distributors.- 53 -
- The emergence of modern Asian trading companies and the Japa-
nese export offensive to the countries under review are rel-
atively recent phenomena and came about after most European and
United States manufacturers had already established their
export marketing channels. Co-operation among the former two
was therefore particularly attractive.
The only empirical evidence available on this latter point is not
very significant. According to the trade channel analysis in
Thailand, local trading companies handled 12.2 per cent of the
imports from Japan, 11.6 per cent of those from the European
Community and 9.2 per cent of imports from the United States .
Yet, the preference of many Japanese exporters to invite local
equity participation in their marketing affiliates in Asia (see
section 3.4) matches with the above hypothesis, too. Examples of
Japanese companies distributing their products through local
companies include not only manufacturers of comparatively undif-
ferentiated products but also companies such as Sony, Nissan and
Fujitsu. European exporters may have been slightly more inclined
to co-operative with local import and distribution companies than
United States companies because of the considerable number of
meanwhile indigenized agency houses of European origin. Again,
however, there is no solid evidence.
In sum, there are a number of plausible reasons for the hypothe-
sized differences between Japanese, European and United States
manufacturers with respect to their reliance on local trading
See Annex table 6.- 54 -
companies in the countries under review. Owing to the absence of
any more comprehensive evidence, however, the hypothesis cannot
be substantiated beyond its present, rather impressionistic char-
acter.
3.4. Establishment of marketing affiliates
Downstream integration into international distribution has become
an important element in the efforts of many major OECD-country
manufacturers to implement global marketing strategies. It has
been particularly important for market leaders in differentiated
and marketing-intensive product markets. Obviously, manufacturers
have moved primarily into fast-growing markets of above-average
size.
The eight countries under review have been a prime example for
this trend, in spite of the numerous restrictions on the estab-
lishment of foreign-owned marketing affiliates. This may be ga-
thered from the substantial inflow of direct foreign investment
into the trade sector of the region (see table 11). In Thailand,
for instance, the cumulative net inflow of direct investment into
the trade sector amounted to US$ 205.4 million or one fifth of
direct investment inflows into all sectors between 1970 and 1980.
While downward integration into overseas marketing and distribu-
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Sources: (a) US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business, August 1982, Vol. 62,
No. 8, p. 22.
(b) Research Institute of Overseas Investment, The Export-Import Bank of Japan, 'Exim-Review', Vol. 2, 1981, p. 34,
(c) National sources.- 56 -
general , there are some notable differences in this respect
between United States, European and Japanese manufacturers sup-
plying developing Asia.
In general, direct marketing through own sales affiliates has
been particularly important for United States companies. This is
mirrored by the considerable share of intra-firm trade of final
2
products in United States total exports and the substantial
amount of United States direct investment into trade, which
amounted to US$ 1.2 billion in 1981 in the eight countries under
review (see table 11). Typical examples of United States compa-
nies channeling their exports to Asia through overseas marketing
affiliates were the oil companies, pharmaceutical firms and manu-
facturers of consumer goods such as Johnson and Johnson, Colgate,
Kodak and Singer as well as companies such as General Electric,
IBM, Du Pont, Otis and Union Carbide. The same held tru'e for the
leading United States companies in banking, shipping, advertis-
ing, insurance, auditing, etc., many of which have established
their subsidiaries in the region. The preference of United States
companies for direct marketing methods was exemplified by Amway
and Avon, two major American producers of personal care and home
As a matter of fact, the balance between manufacturing and
marketing activities seems to shift for many leading multina-
tional corporations into the direction of marketing, increas-
ingly involving third-party products.
2
In 1977, 43 per cent of all United States exports were intra-
firm exports, and majority-owned affiliates abroad of United
States companies sold 57 per cent of their imports from their
parents without any further processing. United States Depart-
ment of Commerce, '1977 benchmark survey of United States di-
rect investment abroad
1, Survey of Current Business, April
1981.- 57 -
care products. Both companies sold their products exclusively
door-to-door through their own, mostly part-time distributors.
Amway, for instance, has managed to organize approximately 50 000
distributors for its products in Malaysia, which was equivalent
to nearly one per cent of Malaysia's adult population. This large
number of distributors is likely to have been a captive market in
itself. More generally, the preference of many United States
manufacturers of consumer products for establishing marketing
affiliates in developing countries has reflected their efforts to
capitalize on the high regard of local consumers for the "Amer-
ican way of life".
For some of the United States major export products, however,
distribution through marketing affiliates was not typical, at
all. Arms and airplanes were normally sold directly by the Amer-
ican manufacturers, with intermediary services being effected by
politically well-connected rather than purely commercial go-be-
tweens. Grain exports and exports to United States affiliated
off-shore production units were other obvious exceptions. It is
probably due to these reasons that the trade channel analysis of
Thai imports does not bear out the preference of United States
manufacturers for exporting through marketing affiliates. The
results in Annex table 6 are strongly influenced by the large
size of air craft exports to the Thai national carrier and elec-
trical component exports to the Thai manufacturing affiliate of
National Semiconductors.- 58 -
In comparison with European and Japanese marketing affiliates in
Asia, United States manufacturers attached more importance to
equity control. Conversely, they were less concerned about the
nationality of management . Not only did United States marketing
affiliates have a lower number of expatriates per company, but
they were in fact frequently managed by non-Americans. Indige-
nization and adaption to local circumstances of United States
marketing affiliates took place at the personnel rather than the
ownership level, which was the precise opposite of the situation
in Japanese marketing affiliates.
Exports through marketing affiliates have not been confined to
United States manufacturers, but were also typical for some of
the leading European companies, particularly in industries like
chemicals and Pharmaceuticals and others which were characterized
2
by oligopolistic market structures at the global level . In gen-
eral, it appears that the differences in export channels between
European and United States manufacturers were primarily the re-
sult of size differences of exporters and of the non-availability
of internationally well-established agency houses in the United
States.
In contrast, Japanese manufacturers were traditionally more re-
luctant to establish fully-owned marketing affiliates. They ex-
hibited a preference for joint-ventures with local partners in
Survey results, see for instance Annex table 4 for a comparison
between European and United States marketing affiliates.
2
Companies such as Ericsson, Gestetner, Philips, Unilever,
Nestle, BASF, Bayer, Hoechst, ICI and Rhone Poulenc all have
marketing affiliates throughout the region.- 59 -
the target market. Collaborating with local partners - frequently
wholesalers and distributors - did not primarily result from
ownership restrictions but rather reflected the attempt of Japa-
nese manufacturers to integrate their local partners' domestic
market expertise into their sales affiliates . This was particu-
larly important for manufacturers catering to the demand for
standard goods. As a result, the average Japanese equity share in
Japanese affiliates in commerce located in developing Asia was
comparatively low with 75.2 per cent in 1982. This was clearly
lower than in all other areas, and notably the OECD countries,
with the only exception of Africa, where similar reasons as in
Asia and foreign ownership restrictions may have determined the
2
preference for joint-ventures . It was also lower than the cor-
responding survey figures for United Stated and European market-
ing affiliates .
In the Philippines, there were 169 Japanese-Filipino wholesale
and retail joint-ventures as compared to only 33 wholly-owned
Japanese trading companies. Japan Trade Center (JETRO), Manila,
A directory of Japanese capital-affiliated domestic corpora-
tions and wholly-owned Japanese enterprises in the Philippines,
Manila 1981. In Singapore, which does not impose any ownership
restrictions, there were as many wholly-owned subsidiaries as
joint-ventures among the 198 Japanese affiliated foreign trade
and commerce companies. See JETRO, Survey of Japanese joint-
ventures in ASEAN countries: Singapore, 1981, p. 184.
2
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Overseas Business
Activities of Japanese Business, 10th and 11th Survey, Toyoho-
ki-Shuppan, 1983, p. 127, cited from Takeshi Mori, A few notes
on the policy issues relating to direct investment, Paper pre-
sented at the Tokyo Workshop on Direct Investment and Technol-
ogy Transfer, June 25-26, 1983, p. 14.
See Annex table 4.- 60 -
3.5. Exports via assembly or production affiliates
One of the most fundamental changes in foreign trade patterns in
the region under review has been the increasing share of imports
of intermediate goods. This process has been fostered by both
import substitution and export expansion and reflects the indus-
trialization process throughout the region. Against this back-
ground, exports of intermediate goods in combination with assem-
bly or production in affiliated local companies have become one
of the most important export marketing strategies for foreign ex-
porters .
The surge of intermediate goods imports followed the reorienta-
tion of Asian economies towards import substitution and domestic-
market oriented industrialization behind tariff walls. This pat-
tern began in the late 1950s in the Philippines, Taiwan and the
Republic of Korea and continued in the mid 1960s in Thailand,
Malaysia and Indonesia. The region's demand for intermediate
goods imports was further increased by the rise of export-orient-
ed industrialization, which began, as well, in the East Asian
developing countries in the early 1960s, followed by Singapore,
Malaysia and the Philippines in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
and started to affect Thailand and Indonesia in the late 1970s.
These two superseding industrialization patterns had a profound
impact on the foreign trade structure. Manufactured exports of
the countries under review (without Taiwan) had reached 44.5 per
cent of total exports in 1981 , and the share of consumer goods
United Nations UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and
Development Statistics, 1984, Supplement, New York 1984.- 61 -
imports had fallen below 10 per cent of total imports for all
countries except Hong Kong. By contrast, intermediate goods im-
ports of Asian manufacturers had become very improtant, as may be
gathered from the international input-output tables of the coun-
tries under review . First, the manufacturing sector had become
the major importing sector. By 1975, 45.6 per cent of all imports
of the ASEAN countries and the Republic of Korea consisted of
imports of Asian manufacturing companies from overseas manufac-
turing companies (see Annex tables 19 and 20). Second, exports of
intermediate goods by overseas manufacturers amounted to 37.9 per
cent of total exports to the region. They exceeded final goods
exports from overseas manufacturers which accounted for 30.3 % of
total exports to the six countries (see Annex table 19). Interme-
diate goods exports of foreign manufacturers to Asian manufactur-
ers had reached 26.7 per cent for the region's total imports and
as much as one third for the Republic of Korea.
For many products, intermediate goods exports to Asia to affil-
iated production units were, in fact, the only remaining opening
to the domestic markets of the countries under review. Auto-
mobiles were a prime example considering the restrictions on im-
ports of completely built-up cars throughout the region and the
growing number of increasingly stringent local content require-
2
ments . More generally, high and partly prohibitive effective
Institute for Developing Economies, International Input-Output
Tables for ASEAN Countries, 1975, Tokyo 1982.
2
See for instance: United Nations Economic and Social Commission
for Asia and the Pacific, The scope for South-East Asian subre-
gional co-operation in the automotive sector, Bangkok 1982.- 62 -
protection rates have triggered off a large-scale export substi-
tution process on the part of overseas manufacturers, as the var-
ious analyses of investment determinants of foreign companies in
the countries under review confirm .
Other factors have further increased the importance of this ex-
port marketing strategy. Local production facilitated the adap-
tation of product design, product functions, packaging etc. to
local requirements. This has become an increasingly important
condition for successful launching and marketing of products. In
a number of industries, local assembly or production has been
associated with cost advantages. For products such as pharmaceu-
ticals, toiletries and cosmetics, substantial transport costs
could be saved if only the active ingredients were imported and
the formulation and packaging was done locally. Many of the lead-
ing manufacturers of Pharmaceuticals and personal care products
have therefore established their own affiliates or have licensed
local manufacturers.
Even more significant have, however, been labour cost advantages,
as the export offensive of Asia's newly industrializing countries
amply demonstrates. The region has become an export platform for
trade with both developed and developing economies. This means in
turn that import demand of Southeast and East Asian countries is
increasingly determined by the input requirements of export-
oriented industrialization. In the Republic of Korea in 1981, for
See Friedrich von Kirchbach, Economic policies towards trans
national corporations, the experience of the ASEAN countries,
(Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1983) , Chapters T IV, P IV, M IV, I IV and
S IV.- 63 -
instance, 43.3 per cent of all imports other than petroleum and
capital goods were raw materials and intermediate goods used for
export production .
Participating in the rapidly growing demand for intermediate
imports by export-oriented manufacturing units required equity
investment in Asia, just as import-substituting industrialization
did before. During both phases, the creation of captive markets
integrated into the overall industrialization patterns turned out
to be the most successful way for participating in the region's
growth. On the export side, this was related to two different
arguments:
- The industrial export boom has been fuelled to a significant
extent by foreign-affiliated companies, in particular in the
ASEAN countries, although transnational corporations cannot be
considered as having been the driving force behind the entire
region's export success. The contributions of foreign affili-
ated companies to industrial exports varied from 37.3 per cent
in 1980 in Thailand to 53.4 per cent in 1982 in Malaysia and
2
89.7 per cent in 1983 in Singapore '. In East Asian developing
countries, their order of magnitude was between 10 and 30 per
cent . -*
Data from the Association of Foreign Trading Agents of Korea.
2
See "Transnational Konzerne und export-orientierte Industria-
lisierung in Siidostasien-Oberlegungen zum Paradebeispiel Singa-
pur", in: H. Durr, R. Hanisch (eds.), Siidostasien - Grofiraum im
Schnittfeld von GroBmachtinteressen, Westermannverlag, Braun-
schweig, forthcoming.
See, for instance, United Nations, ESCAP/UNCTC Joint Unit on
Transnational Corporations, Transnational Corporations and
their Impact on Economic Development in Asia and the Pacific,
ST/ESCAP/207, Bangkok 1982.- 64 -
- Locally-owned export-oriented manufacturers in Asia tended to
be less import dependent than their foreign-affiliated compet-
itors . Overall, foreign companies have swiftly reacted to the
new opportunites arising from the industrialization strategies
of the countries under review, and the region experienced a
substantial inflow of trade-related foreign investment into
their manufacturing sectors. As may be seen from table 12,
annual inflows of direct investment into the manufacturing
sectors averaged between US$ 30 and 60 million per country and
were even significantly higher for Indonesia and Singapore.
Yet, domestic-market oriented industries such as chemicals,
textiles and food, beverage and tobacco accounted for the major
share of investment inflows.
As a result of these developments, foreign-affiliated companies
have become the leading type of importers in many of the coun-
tries under review. In Thailand, foreign-affiliated manufacturers
handled 38 per cent of all imports in 1980 (see Annex table 5) ,
notwithstanding the fact that Thailand attracted the smallest
amount of foreign investment among the ASEAN countries in abso-
lute as well as in per-capita terms. In Malaysia, foreign-con-
trolled limited companies in the manufacturing sector handled
24.5 per cent of Malaysian imports in 1981 (see Annex table 10).
In the Philippines, 35.8 per cent of all imports in 1970 were
In Malaysia, for instance, locally-owned manufacturing compa-
nies imported in 1982 0.7 dollars for 1 dollar of export earn-
ings, compared to 1.06 dollars for foreign-controlled limited
companies in Malaysia. Department of Statistics, Report of the
Financial Survey of Limited Companies, Malaysia, 1982, Kuala
Lumpur 1984.- 65 -
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Sources: Indonesia, Badan Koordinasi, Penanaman Modal; Malaysia, Malaysian Industrial Development Authority; Philippines,
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guide to Korea 1982', Ministry of Finance; Taiwan, Ministry of Economic Affairs; Hongkong, Asian Finance Publication
Ltd., Asia 1984, Measures and Magnitudes.- 67 -
done by foreign-affiliated companies . In Singapore, this share
is likely to have been much higher, considering that 90 per cent
of total manufactured exports were handled by foreign-affiliated
2 3 4
companies in 1983 . For the Republic of Korea and Indonesia , as
well, the significant role of foreign-affiliated companies in
exports and the latters' pronounced import dependence suggest
that foreign affiliated manufacturers represented one of the
major import channels in these two countries.
These figures leave no doubt about the importance of foreign
assembly and manufacturing affiliates as export marketing chan-
nels. Again, this marketing strategy has been pursued in varying
degrees by Japanese, United States and European manufacturers,
respectively. The trade channel analysis in Thailand (see Annex
table 6) brings out clearly, that Japanese exporters have chan-
neled the largest share, namely 52.2 per cent, of their exports
to Thailand through affiliated manufacturing companies, compared
to 39.4 per cent for United States exporters and 25.4 per cent
for European exporters.
Friedrich von Kirchbach, 1983, loc.cit., p. 275.
2
Department of Statistics, Singapore, Report on the Census of Industrial
Production, 1983.
3
In the Republic of Korea, the share of foreign-affiliated companies in na-
tional exports amounted to 23 per cent in 1978. United Nations, ESCAP/UNCTC
Joint Unit on Transnational Corporations, Economic and Social Commission for
Asia and the Pacific, Costs and conditions of technology transfer through
transnational corporations, ESCAP/UNCTC publications series B, no. 3, Bang-
kok 1984, p. 59.
4
The share of foreign-affiliated companies in Indonesian exports (including
the petroleum sector) in the 1970s was put at roughly two thirds. Kilian
Sihotang, Private auslandische Direktinvestitionen in Indonesien. 1870-1980.
Rahmenbedingungen, Struktur und Entwicklungseff ekte, Stuttgart: Edition
Erdmann in K. Thienemanns Verlag, 1983, p. 324. Moreover foreign-affiliated
companies play a lead role in Indonesia's modern, import-substituting manu-
facturing sector.- 68 -
Significantly, the share of foreign-affiliated manufacturing
companies in Thai imports from Japan was high across the board
with the only exception of the quantitatively marginal imports of
the food and tobacco industry, wood and wood products and miscel-
laneous products. By contrast, the corresponding values for the
United States were highly influenced by the intra-firm imports of
a few electronic-component manufacturers.
This pattern closely reflects the leading position of Japan as
source country of foreign investment in Thailand's manufacturing
sector. The argument is not, that Japanese-affiliated manufactur-
ing units were more import-dependent than affiliates of Western
manufacturers , but that Japanese manufacturers have been more
willing to establish assembly and manufacturing subsidiaries than
their Western competitors. A comparison of investment and trade
statistics corroborates this point. In terms of book value, Japa-
nese direct investment in the eight countries under review
amounted to US$ 9.6 billion in 1980, compared to US$ 7.8 billion
from the United States. By contrast, investment from the Federal
Republic of Germany stood at US$ 0.5 billion, only. In relative
terms, 26.5 per cent of Japanese foreign investment had gone to
the eight countries under review compared to 3.7 per cent of
total United States investment and 1.3 per cent of German invest-
As a matter of fact, the share of purchases of raw materials,
machines etc. of Japanese manufacturing subsidiaries in Asia
from Japan in total purchases declined from 50.8 per cent in
1975 to 43.2 per cent in 1982. Ministry of International Trade
and Industry, Japan, Overseas Business Activities of Japanese
Businesses, 5th, 10th and 11th survey, Toyohoki-Shuppan, 1983.- 69 -
ment . As far as trade was concerned, Japanese exports to the
ASEAN countries, Hong Kong and the Republic of Korea accounted
for 17.8 per cent of global Japanese exports. The corresponding
ratios for the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany
were 7.3 per cent and 2.2 per, cent respectively. Hence, Japanese
companies have allocated a significantly larger share of their
investment budget to the region under review than the one that
would correspond to the size of Japanese exports to the region.
Conversely, for United States and European companies, the share
of the region in their overseas investment was substantially
2
smaller than the region's share in their exports . The preference
of Japanese manufacturers, as compared to United States manufac-
turers, for exports via overseas manufacturing affiliates may be
derived, as well, from the sectoral distribution of direct in-
vestment statistics. In 1980 Japanese direct investment into the
trade sector of developing Asian countries amounted to 8.8 per
cent of Japanese direct investment in the manufacturing sectors
of developing Asia. For the United States, the corresponding
ratio was 49.0 per cent for the eight countries under review . In
Dietrich Kebschull, Auslandische Direktinvestitionen in Siidost-
asien, Ein internationaler Vergleich des Engagements, in: H.
Laumer (ed.), 1984, loc.cit., p. 461.
2
The difference between Japan and the United States is actually
even more pronounced owing to the large share of petroleum and
mining investment in United States direct investment stocks in
the region. In 1983, this share was 79.9 per cent for the eight
countries under review. United States Department of Commerce,
Survey of Current Business, cited from Business International,
23 November 1984, p. 372.
United States data relates to 1981, United States Department of
Commerce, Survey of Current Business, Vol. 62, no. 8, August
1982, and Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Japan,
News from MITI, 14 October 1981.- 70 -
absolute term, Japanese investment in the manufacturing sectors
of the eight countries under review was roughly twice as high as
United States investment .
The importance Japanese companies attach to the marketing func-
tion of their overseas manufacturing affiliates is obvious, as
well, from their personnel policy. An analysis of 200 foreign-
affiliated manufacturing companies in Thailand showed, that 3 2.2
per cent of all Japanese expatriates worked in the marketing
field as compared to only 16.7 per cent of the expatriates in
2
United States companies and 20.4 per cent in European companies .
The relative importance of exporting intermediate goods to the
region for European, Japanese and United States companies may
also be derived from the 1975 international input-output tables
of the ASEAN countries and the Republic of Korea. Considering the
leading role of Japanese companies in exports to the region via
affiliated manufacturing units in the final markets, one would
expect a particularly high share of Japanese suppliers in the
region's imports of intermediate goods. This holds true. In 1975,
Notified and approved direct overseas investment from Japan in
the manufacturing sectors of the eight countries under review
amounted to approximately US$ 4.5 billion in 1980, compared to
US$ 2.6 billion from the United States in 1983. See Ministry of
International Trade and Industry, Japan, News from MITI, 14
October 1981, and Business International, 23 November 1984, p.
372.
2
Ian MacGovern, Managerial aspects of technology transfer in
Thailand, paper submitted to the seminar on 'Technology trans-
fer, transformation and development
1, Bangkok 2-6 Sep. 1983,
mimeo, p. 11.- 71 -
Japanese manufacturers accounted for 46.9 per cent of interme-
diate goods imports of the region's manufacturing companies from
overseas manufacturers, compared to the 26.9 per cent share of
Japanese imports in total imports of the region. And while Japa-
nese manufacturers exported 8 7.5 per cent more final goods to the
six countries than United States manufacturers, the formers'
exports of intermediate goods surpassed those of United States
manufacturers by 200.3 per cent (see Annex tables 19 and 20).
These results dovetail into the findings of the trade channel
analysis in Thailand. More recent data on the procurement of raw
materials, machines, etc. of Japanese manufacturing subsidiaries
in Asia add additional support to this point. In 1982, 43.2 per
cent of their suppliers came from Japan .>
More generally, the input-output data pinpoint the differences in
the economic function of the region for Japanese and for United
States companies. For Japan, imports of intermediate goods, no-
tably from the primary sectors of resource-rich countries of the
region, accounted for the bulk, namely 87.5 per cent of Japan's
total imports from the region. Conversely, Japanese imports of
final goods were quite small; with 12.5 per cent for the ASEAN
countries plus the Republic of Korea and 5.2 per cent for the
five ASEAN countries, alone (see Annex table 19) . The large
amount of Japanese intermediate goods exports to the region was
mentioned above. While a substantial share of these exports have
been channeled to Japanese subsidiaries in the region, the latter
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Japan, Overseas
Business Activities of Japanese Businesses, Nos. 5, 10 and 11.- 72 -
have generally either produced for the local market or for third
markets. The participation of sogo shosha in Japanese manufactur-
ing subsidiaries in the region greatly facilitated the transition
from a pure, domestic-market orientation to more outward-looking
sales patterns. This was particularly obvious during the 1975
crisis of Thailand's textile sector, when the sogo shosha and
their joint ventures made a notable contribution to the exporting
and marketing of Thai textile products abroad. With the possible
exception of the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, however, the re-
gion has hardly been used as a low-cost production base for re-
exports to Japan. As a result, Japan's trade balance with the
region has been balanced or even positive, notwithstanding the
large imports of raw materials.
The role of the region in the international division of labour of
United States companies was quite different. First, only half of
United States intermediate goods exported to the region came from
the manufacturing sector - as compared to 9 2.6 per cent for Japan
-, bearing witness to the importance of primary sector exports in
United States foreign trade. Intermediate goods exports and final
goods exports of United States manufacturing companies had the
same order of magnitude, which showed the relative specialization
of United States manufacturers on final goods exports as compared
to Japanese or total exports to the region. Second, United States
final goods imports from the region were substantial, reflecting
the importance of the region as an export platform of manufactur-
ers to the United States. The ratio of United States imports of
final goods from the region and exports of intermediate goods to- 73 -
the region by the manufacturing sector may serve as an indicator.
It stood at 134.9 per cent for the United States, compared to
21.2 per cent for Japan.
Since 1975, the export platform character of the region for the
United States economy has markedly increased. While Hong Kong,
the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and Singapore exported in 1975 26
per cent, 30 per cent, 36 per cent and 14 per cent, respectively,
of their total exports to the United States, these shares had
increased to 33 per cent, 35 per cent, 49 per cent and 20 per
cent in 1984. Practically all of this expansion took place since
1981
1.
In sum, exports of intermediate goods via affiliated manufactur-
ing units in Asia have proved to be a particularly successful if
not the most important export marketing strategy for OECD-country
manufacturers interested in the countries under review. It is in
this field that Japanese companies have secured a clear edge over
their Western competitors: Japanese direct investment in the
manufacturing sectors of the countries under review has been
significantly higher than United States and European investment.
In addition, Japanese companies have channeled more investment to
Asia than would correspond to the Asian share in Japanese ex-
ports, whereas they adopted the opposite strategy for OECD coun-
tries. United States and German companies, on the other hand,
allocated less direct investment to the region than the share
corresponding to the region's importance in exports. Finally, Ja-
Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 September 19 85, p. 99.- 74 -
panese companies attached more priority to industrial investment
over investment in trade than United States companies. In this
sense, Kojima's differentiation between trade-oriented Japanese
and anti-trade oriented United States investment is valid, in-
deed, for the countries under review .
3.6. Exports via licensing of local companies
Alternatively to the direct investment route, a growing number of
OECD country firms has tried to establish captive markets for
their exports by licensing and technology agreements with Asian
manufacturers. This development has been fostered by both pull
and push factors. With growing technological absorption capacity,
many of the more advanced Asian manufacturers have given priority
to technological co-operation over joint-ventures. OECD-country
manufacturers, as well, have increasingly learned to employ this
approach not only as a second-best solution. The growing number
of these contracts speaks for itself. In four of the eight coun-
tries under review, alone, more than 1300 technology and licens-
ing contracts had been registered by the early 1980s (see table
13). In 1981, annual payments for technology contracts ranged
from US$ 58 million for Thailand over US$ 68 million for the
2
Philippines to US$ 107 million for the Republic of Korea . As a
matter of fact, Thai payments for technology contracts from 1972-
1981 amounted to 31 per cent of outflows of profits and dividends
See Kiyoshi Kojima, Japan and a new world economic order, To-
kyo, Charles E.'Tuttle Company, 1977.
2
United Nations, ESCAP/UNCTC Joint Unit on Transnational Corpo-
rations, 1984, loc.cit., p. 10.- 75 -



















































aIncludes F.R.G. and United Kingdom, only. - TVIay include technology contracts from
Europe. -
 CIncludes U.K., F.R.G., Sweden, France, Italy. - Of which at least 41 con-
tracts or 3.1 percent are from Australia.
Source; United Nations, ESCAP/UNCTC Joint Unit on Transnational Corporations, Economic
and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Cost and conditions of technol-
ogy transfer through transnational corporations, ESCAP/UNCTC Publication
Series B No. 3, ST/ESCAP/283, Bangkok 1984, pp. 14, 61, 115.- 76 -
remitted by foreign-affiliated companies .
While Japan has been the most important source country of tech-
nology contracts, the edge over United States and European compa-
nies was less pronounced than in the case of direct investment in
the manufacturing sector. Judging by data for the Republic of
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, 35.9 per cent of
the licensors were Japanese, 26.9 per cent United States and
about 26 per cent European companies (see table 13). Interesting-
ly, technology imports from other developing countries have ac-
celerated in recent years, parallel to the dynamic development of
intra-Asian investment and trade.
The interests of licensors in technology contracts were generally
broader than the creation of captive export markets. In fact,
while tied-in purchase requirements for licensors were among the
most frequent restrictions licensors tried to incorporate into
technology contracts, they characterized only a small share of
all contracts. In the United Nations study on technology contract
in Asian countries, the shares of contracts containing tied-in
purchase clauses ranged from a low of 7.5 per cent for Thailand
over 12.6 per cent for the Philippines and 14.6 per cent for
2
Malaysia to 16.5 per cent for the Republic of Korea .
Industries in which these clauses appeared frequently were elec-
trical products and electronics, machinery, chemicals and food
1 ibid, p. 195.
ibid, p. 34.- 77 -
products . The data did not suggest any significant differences
between Japanese United States and European licensors, as far as
the frequency of this clause or other restrictive clauses was
concerned. Yet, the industrial distribution of contracts differed
obviously for the major source countries. Whereas European and
United States companies had concluded a considerable number of
technology contracts with Asian manufacturers of chemicals, food
2
and beverages , contracts with Japanese licensors concentrated
more in electrical and electronic products, textiles and trans-
port equipment.
A comparison of the European share in imports, direct investment
and technology contracts of the countries under review suggests,
that European companies have been relatively more successful as
licensors than as direct exporters or investors. This is likely
to be the result of two peculiarities of the European export
sector, namely the participation of a large number of medium and
even small firms (in contrast to the situation in the United
States) and the absence of any equivalent to Japan's sogo shosha
which could have functioned as catalysts for European investment
in marketing and production affiliates in Asia. Under these cir-
cumstances, licensing has been an attractive option for European
companies interested in Southeast and East Asian developing coun-
tries. In view of the increasing importance of this type of in-
ibid, pp. 80, 220.
2
Franchises of United States manufacturers of soft drinks are
typical examples of licensing contracts aimed at promoting the
licensor's exports (in this case the beverage concentrates).- 78 -
ternational business cooperation, the experience of European
companies in this respect may turn out as a key asset for their
future activities in the region.
4. Determinants of the narrow range of distribution channels for
European exports to Southeast and East Asian developing coun-
tries
The preceding sections show that the distribution and marketing
channels for European exports to the countries under review have
been narrow in scope and not fully adapted to the growth pattern
of the region. This comparative disadvantage has been tightly
intertwined with the limited role that has been allocated to this
region in the international division of labour by European compa-
nies. In a nutshell, most European companies have seen the region
as an export market for final products, which was too small and
too distant to warrant major commitments for its development. In
contrast, Japanese and United States companies have pursued a
more comprehensive approach to benefit from the multiform econom-
ic potential of the region. A review by major economic sectors
underlines this point (see Diagram 1) . As far as the primary
sector is concerned, European companies have generally stuck to
the role of distant buyers of primary commodities, although the
primary sectors continued to be the backbone of most Southeast
Asian economies.- 79 -
Diagram 1
The Role of Southeast Asian Economies in the International Division of Labour
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Post colonial European investment in agro-business, mining and
petroleum has been small in comparison to United States and Japa-
nese investment in these sectors. There was no European equiva-
lent to either the United States major oil companies and their
massive investment in the region or the Japanese general trading
companies and their key role in many of the region's top mining
projects. This has not been without repercussions for the export
potential of European companies catering to the demand of prima-
ry-sector companies for capital goods, equipment, engineering
services etc.
The domestic markets of the countries under review have been
coveted by Japanese, European and United States manufacturers,
alike. The reliance of many European manufacturers on the tradi-- 80 -
tional, foreign agency houses, however, has not worked to the
formers' advantage, especially if compared to the Japanese ap-
proach of using the combination of sogo'shosha and Asian distrib-
utors, or to the preference of United States companies for ex-
porting through their own marketing affiliates. More importantly,
European manufacturers have not attached much importance to
Southeast Asia as a location for investment and production. This
has deprived European companies of participating in the region's
economic growth at two different levels. First, the phase of
import substitution or rather domestic-market oriented industri-
alization behind tariff walls required overseas suppliers to
switch from exports of final goods to exports of intermediate
goods to affiliated production or assembly units located in the
final markets. Japanese manufacturers were, most successful in
this area, as may be gathered from their substantial investment
in domestic-market oriented manufacturing units in the region as
well as from the large amount of their intermediate-goods ex-
ports. Second, the region became, in the latest 1960s and early
1970s, an increasingly attractive low-cost production base for
labour-intensive production steps. United States companies in
particular, have used the region's labour force for re-exports to
the United States market. This was less typical for European
manufacturers, partly because they have rather used countries in
the European periphery as low-cost production bases. In the
1970s, the more advanced countries in the region evolved into
full-fledged industrial export platforms for the world market.
Although some European companies have participated in this devel-
opment, Southeast and East Asian developing countries have not- 81 -
become as important a low-cost production base for European com-
panies, as it has for United States manufacturers (with the em-
phasis on exports to the United States) and for Japanese compa-
nies (with the emphasis on production for the world market).
Finally, European involvement in the thriving service sectors in
Asia has been more limited than that of United States and Ja-
panese companies. This is particularly evident in banking, in-
surance and advertising.
Overall, Japanese companies have been far more skillful than
their competitors in following the tides of economic development
in Southeast and East Asia, including the often dissociated de-
velopment patterns in different sectors of the same country. In
practically none of the economies under review was there a smooth
transition from import-substituting to export-oriented industri-
alization. Instead, the beginning of industrial export orienta-
tion has generally begun with the introduction of export incen-
tives which co-existed with deeply entrenched disincentives for
exports. Export processing zones in otherwise rather inward-look-
ing economies exemplify this situation. While Japanese economic
relations with the region have adopted these various develop-
ments, European companies have generally followed a highly se-
lective approach in their marketing strategies as well as their
economic interface with Southeast Asia in general. They have
concentrated on a particular sector (i.e. manufacturing), on
particular phases in economic development, on specific price
segments in a given market (see below) and on a narrow range of
distribution channels. As a result, the involvement of European- 82 -
companies has frequently been below the critical mass, beyond
which crossfertilization of different projects takes place and
economies of scale amplify the impact of otherwise disconnected
activities.
One may find a number of rational explanations for the limited
differentation of European export marketing channels in Asia as
well as for the underlying, low-level participation in the re-
gion's growth potential. One can point to the increasing compet-
itive pressure in Europe's traditional markets, including the EEC
itself, to the fact that Europe is not part of the Pacific Basin,
or to the historical development of the company structure in
European economies, as compared to the patterns in Japan or the
United States. From the preceding analysis, however, the impres-
sion emerges that many European companies have underestimated the
potential of Southeast and East Asia, that they have lacked in-
terest in these particular markets and that they have failed to
update their marketing and distribution networks in the region.
The analysis of distribution channels suggests that, as a result
of the above, European exporters have suffered a comparative
disadvantage in this field, which has undoubtedly affected the
competitive position of European exports in the markets under
review. This implies, that remedies to the declining participa-
tion of European companies in Southeast and East Asia are not
only to be found in the sphere of production or financing, but
also in the area of export marketing and distribution. And as the
comparative disadvantage in this field appears to reflect at
least partly a certain lack of interest in this particular region- 83 -
rather than a general disadvantage of European companies in the
marketing field, a halt or at least slowing-down of the present
trend may be possible.
On the basis of these results, one would expect to find that
European companies exhibited limited interest in adapting to
specific Asian circumstances also as far as other marketing vari-
ables are concerned. The following section examines this question
with respect to the positioning of products in terms of prices
and the extent of product adaptation.
5. Differences in the positioning of products between European,
Japanese and United States companies
The positioning of products within a specific market in terms of
prices and quality is another key variable in marketing. In the
context of the present study, this point gains particular weight
because of the pronounced segmentation of markets in Asia. With
the exception of a few Latin American countries, there is pro-
bably no other region in the world in which the sources of demand
comprise the entire range from leading manufacturers employing
state-of-the art technology and consumers rich by any standard
down to backyard shops and rural households with very limited
cash income.
In most product markets, one may distinguish at least three dif-
ferent layers (see diagram 2):
See Hellmut Schutte, "Drehscheibe aller Auslandsaktivitaten",
in Absatzwirtschaft, No. 3, 1983, p. 236.- 84 -
Diagram 2





























Source: adapted from Hellmut Schiitte, Drehscheibe aller Aus-
landsaktivitaten, in Absatzwirtschaft, No. 3, 1983, p.
236
1. the modern or elite market segment. This is the generally
small, top-price segment. Products are highly differentiated and
demand fairly price inelastic. For consumer goods it includes the
big names in passenger cars, fashion, watches, alcoholic bever-
ages, etc., the consumption of which is confined to westernized
elites. For intermediate and capital goods, this segment encom-
passes primarily the demand of foreign-affiliated and some lead-
ing local companies for state-of-the-art machinery and high-qual-
ity intermediate goods;- 85 -
2. the transitional market segment. Demand in this segment ema-
nates from consumers in the middle-income bracket and companies
producing for them. Income and price elasticity of demand tends
to be high. Typical consumer goods in this market segment are
household appliances such as electric fans, refrigerators, radios
and TVs. In the two city states Hong Kong and Singapore the major
share of the population belongs to this segment. In the other
countries, the delimitation between the transitional and the
traditional market segment would follow roughly the official
poverty line. As far as intermediate and capital goods are con-
cerned, the segment of economic transition includes the demand of
primarily locally-owned, medium-scale manufacturing firms as well
as the demand of medium and large cash-crop farms for agricultur-
al inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides, agricultural machinery
etc. ;
3. the traditional market segment. This segments includes the
rural majority of the population and the informal commercial
sector such as cottage industries . Market integration is limited
by low budgets which barely cover daily necessities as well as
generally underdeveloped physical infrastructure in rural areas
and a more sceptical outlook of consumers on Western consumption
This segment is significntly smaller in the three East-Asian
developing countries and Singapore than in the other four ASEAN
countries. A recent class analysis of selected NIC-countries
put the marginalized class at 15 per cent of the work force in
the Republic of Korea, 5.6% in Taiwan and even less in Hong
Kong. Independent and salaried middleclass on the other hand,
accounted for 42.0%, 41.9% and 14.2% respectively, the remain-
der being primarily working class. See: Helmut Asche, Industri-
alisierte Dritte Welt? Ein Vergleich von Gesellschaftsstruktu-
ren in Taiwan, Hong Kong und Sudkorea, Hamburg 1984, p. 264.- 86 -
patterns. Producing companies are characterized by an extremely
low level of capitalization which prevents the employment of
anything but the cheapest raw materials and intermediate inputs
and the most basic implements.
Priority needs, decision making mechanisms, buying habits, price
sensitiveness and attitudes towards product promotion vary vastly
between different segments. Some characteristics of Indonesian
consumers may be cited as an example (see Annex tables 12 and
13). The lack of electricity, for instance, excludes a consider-
able share even of the urban population from the demand for stan-
dard electric household appliances. The possession of TVs, elec-
trical fans or motorcycles which is typical for the top quarter
of urban households in Indonesia is an exception for low income
groups. And while the bulk of low-income households will go "out
of their way to find a cheaper price" and "always buy the cheap-
est brand" the more well-to-do households are far less price
sensitive. Similarly, advertisement reaches and affects low-
income households to a much lesser extent than high income house-
holds in Jakarta.
Moreover, each of the various market segments has its own growth
and mobility pattern. This has further complicated the appro-
priate positioning of products as both the pronounced segmen-
tation and the dynamic development of each segment have to be
taken into account.- 87 -
The following paragraphs seek to investigate, whether exporters
from different home countries have concentrated on different
market segments and whether this has played any significant role
in their overall success in the region.
5.1. Pricing
In relation to the positioning of products in terms of pricing
the differences between European, United States, Japanese and
other Asian exporters appear to be very pronounced, indeed. In
general, European companies have aimed at the top price segments,
whereas Japanese and even more so other Asian companies have
responded to the medium and bottom price segments of the demand
curve. This has often confined the commercialization of European
products to the comparatively small and price-inelastic demand of
well-to-do, urban and westernized consumers and the most advanced
manufacturing units. In contrast, Japanese exporters have been
far more successful in penetrating the more price-sensitive, but
large and rapidly-growing segment of economic transition and
partly even entered the traditional market segment, to which many
of the exporters from other Asian developing countries cater.
These differences in the positioning of products are partly borne
out by the Thai trade channel analysis. Average import prices
were clearly the highest for imports from the EEC, followed by
those from the United States. Average import prices from Japan
were much lower, on the average even below those of imports from
other Asian countries (see Table 14) . Although these indices do- 88 -
Table 14 - Unweighted means of Thai average import price indices

























mean for imports from Japan:
n IF!
3
with: iP . T : annual import value of major 354 Thai importers
^' P of product j from Japan divided by annual import
quantity from Japan
iP. : annual import value of major 354 Thai importers
^ of product j divided by annual import quantity
j : 1,2,...,144 (see Annex table 1)
Source: as for Annex table 5.
not reveal to what extent price differences reflect the position-
ing of products in terms of quality (i.e. product heterogeneity)
or cost advantages, the significant differences point to a com-
petitive advantage of Japanese suppliers in the price-conscious
Asian markets .
In addition, a regression was run for all major import products
While the author gained the impression that lower prices for
Japanese imports generally reflected both elements, an empir-
ical quantification of these two factors would have been ex-
tremely difficult and has not been attempted.- 89 -
to examine the influence of different countries of origin, trade
channels and the size of annual transactions per firm on relative
import prices (see Annex table 18 for the specification and the
results of the regression).
On the basis of the above reasoning, it was expected that a high
share of imports from Japan for a particular product and trade
channel would have a negative coefficient in relation to average
import prices, whereas the opposite would be true for imports
from Europe or the United States. Import prices were expected to
be higher for foreign-affiliated companies (trade channels 1,2,3,
5,11,12 and 13) than for Thai companies (channels 6,7,14 and 8
(local trading companies) which was chosen as point of refer-
ence) , because foreign-affiliated companies were thought to com-
pete in higher-price segments of the market and tend to have
higher operating costs than local companies. The size of annual
imports of a particular commodity per company was expected to
have a lowering influence on average import prices because of
economies of scale. While the regression was significant at the 5
per cent level, the above-mentioned factors explained only a very
2
small share of the import price variations (R =3.0 per cent),
as product heterogeneity and, hence, price differences could not
be eliminated within each product category. Nevertheless, most of
the results pointed into the direction expected from the above
argument. The share of imports from Europe turned out to have a
positive coefficient in relation to the. Thai import price index
followed by a smaller positive coefficient for imports from the
United States, whereas imports from Japan and from other Asian- 90 -
countries showed a negative coefficient in relation to Thai im-
port price indices. Only the last factor, however, was signif-
icant at the 10 per cent level. None of the trade channel coef-
ficients turned out to be statistically significant. Yet their
signs pointed in general into the expected direction. The two
most important types of locally-owned importers in Thailand (lo-
cal trading companies and local manufacturing companies, trade
channels 8 and 14) turned out to have lower coefficients than
foreign-affiliated manufacturing companies (trade channels, 11,
12,13), agency houses and the very small own-business operations
of the sogo shosha (trade channels 2 and 1). The coefficients for
imports of the Thai Government and of the newly established and
especially promoted local trading companies (trade channels 6 and
7) , however, tend to confirm the difficulties which these two
types of companies experienced in competing with long-established
private Thai traders. The coefficient for marketing affiliates
(trade channel 3) suggested that the latter were able to import
at comparatively low prices. This shall be discussed below.
The correlation coefficients between the variables "share of
imports from Japan in total imports of a particular trade channel
and a particular product" with the corresponding shares of im-
ports from the United States or Europe of the same trade channel
and product showed an interesting pattern: While it was relative-
ly common, that a particular type of company imported from both
the United States and Europe (correlation coefficient of
-0.14836), the coexistence of imports from Japan and the EEC was
more unlikely (-0.42974). The corresponding value for simulta-- 91 -
neous imports from the United States and Japan was with -0.28857
between the two above values. The implication is that European
and Japanese exporters were using rather different marketing
channels and that there appeared to be little head-on competition
and little complementarity between imports from Europe and the
United States, if compared to the relation between imports from
the United States and Europe or even the United States and Japan.
This tends to support the above-mentioned hypothesis of niche
strategies pursued by many European companies.
The differences in pricing strategies become more obvious at a
disaggregated product level. Annex tables 14 to 17 provide an
overview of Thai average import prices by sectors, countries of
origin and trade channels. In the field of food, beverage and
tobacco imports, the reliance of European exporters on high-price
and high-quality products distributed by agency houses was par-
ticularly evident. Three European agency houses, for instance,
handled one third of Thai milk and cream imports, with average
import prices of these imports from Europe being more than twice
as high as the national average or as import prices of foreign-
affiliated manufacturers in Thailand.
Import prices of foreign agency houses have often been high not
only in comparison to local trading companies but also in rela-
tion to import prices of foreign-affiliated manufacturing com-
panies on marketing affiliates. This reflected primarily the
different approach of overseas manufacturers. European principals
appointing distributors rather than establishing their own sales- 92 -
affiliates often attached marginal importance to the market con-
cerned. They tended to fix prices at a high level in order to
cream off the top-price segment of demand. Principals establish-
ing their own sales or manufacturing subsidiary have generally
assessed the market more optimistically. They have been more
likely to adopt a long-term market development strategy and to
export at marginal prices. These differences are most pronounced
for products such as Pharmaceuticals or electronic consumer goods
requiring little adaptation to local market conditions. There are
a few examples of Asian manufacturing subsidiaries of European
companies, which have successfully employed this latter strategy
and have been able to establish themselves firmly in markets for
standard nondurable consumer goods in urban as well as in rural
areas. Nestle's production and sales of Chinese noodles in Malay-
sia and Unilever's success with soap in Indonesia are cases in
point.
Also as far as intermediate goods were concerned, marketing af-
filiates and foreign-affiliated manufacturing companies have fre-
quently been able to import at low prices, even in comparison to
local trading companies. In Thailand, for instance, foreign-af-
filiated producing companies handled 60.6 per cent of total im-
ports of fuels and minerals at prices well below those of the
major local importers .
Excluding those with equity participation by foreign-affiliated
trading companies.
2
These differences are unlikely to be the result of underinvoic-
ing, as foreign-affiliated companies in Thailand have little
incentive to underinvoice on imports.- 93 -
In the area of Thai chemical imports, there was keen competition
between European, Japanese and United States manufacturers with
aggregated market shares being fairly equal, although Japanese
exporters concentrated more on bulk chemicals whereas European
companies were particularly strong in fine chemicals. At the
product level, import prices from Japan were below average for
products such as non-nitrogenous fertilizers, phosphates, cyclic
hydrocarbons or Pharmaceuticals whereas import prices for syn-
thetic dyestuffs, paints, odoriferous substances, insecticides
and fungicides from Europe were lower than those of competing
products from Japan. Foreign-affiliated manufacturing units were
the most important type of importer for chemicals from Europe,
Japan and the USA, alike. Import prices for chemicals from Japan
closely followed the hierarchical market segmentation as pictured
in diagram 2. Imports of foreign-affiliated manufacturers showed
the highest average prices, followed by major local manufacturers
whereas local traders registered the lowest average prices for
their chemical imports which they generally distributed to small,
local final users. This pattern was somewhat reversed for chemi-
cal imports from Europe. Here, foreign agency-houses were on top
of the range of average import prices followed by major local
manufacturers and, only in the third place, by foreign-affiliated
manufacturers and marketing affiliates. The success of European
chemical exporters to the region can be attributed to both the
competitive pricing and the differentiated distribution systems.
Photographic films have been another area in which pricing and
positioning strategies differed markedly between the three pro-- 94 -
tagonists Kodak, Agfa and Fuji . In the early 1970s, Agfa had a
market share of reportedly one third of imported films in Thai-
land, second only to Kodak, which supplied more than half of the
market. Within the last decade, Fuji increased its market share
from a very small level to approximately one quarter, primarily
at the expense of Agfa, which has fallen below 5 per cent in the
early 1980s. The success of Fuji was based on three major vari-
ables. First, Fuji did a tremendous amount of market research
throughout the country. Second, Fuji adopted the 'follow-the-
leader principle
1 and chose a chemical development process which
is compatible with the one for Kodak films and which was, in
2
contrast to Agfa's process, adapted to tropical temperatures .
Third, Fuji priced its products at 15 to 20 per cent below the
prices of Kodak.
These findings corroborated similar observations in other markets
on the skilfulness of Japanese companies in positioning their
products. A survey of marketing directors in fifteen equivalent
Japanese and British firms operating in the United Kingdom, for
instance, revealed that the Japanese companies practised market
segmentation to a much larger extent than their British compet-
itors. In Britain, however, they relied by no means on the lower
price and quality segments of the market . This suggests that the
Information from company interviews.
2
The Kodak process apparently requires the heating of a solution
whereas the Agfa process requires the cooling down of the solu-
tion's temperature which is obviously more complicated and
expensive. Only very recently, Agfa headquarters undertook the
necessary product adaptation.
P. Doyle et al., "Why Japan Out-Markets Britain", in: Marketing
Today (UK), May 1985, pp. 63-70.- 95 -
positioning of Japanese products down market of competing Western
products in Asia reflects a special marketing approach rather
than an overall specialization of Japanese manufacturers on these
market segments.
5.2. Market research and product adaptation
The skilful market segmentation and positioning of products of
Japanese companies has generally been the result of extensive
market research in combination with product adaptation. European
businessmen in the region have often pointed to the tremendous
amount of market research, which typically precedes the intro-
duction of new Japanese products . The results of this market
research are fed into an integrated marketing approach, which
includes product adaptation, pricing, distribution and promotion.
Product adaptation has been a key element in this approach and
Japanese manufacturers have generally undertaken more efforts to
adapt products to suit Asian demand patterns than European or
United States competitors have.
Commercial vehicles are striking example. The Japanese companies
Isuzu and Hino have carved out large market shares in most of the
2
countries under review because of their special product adapta-
Information from interviews.
2
See for instance: United Nations, Economic and Social Commis-
sion for Asia and the Pacific, The scope of South-east Asian
subregional co-operation in the automotive sector, Bangkok
1982.- 96 -
tion and competitive pricing. The average unit price of Thai
imports of chassis fitted with engined from Japan was at 15.8 per
cent of that of imports from Europe. For work trucks it was at
63.2 per cent of the European level and at 36.3 per cent of the
average import price from the United States and for special pur-
pose motor carriers and vans the corresponding ratios were 22.1
per cent and 83.9 per cent, respectively . M.A.N. , on the other
hand, which did not adapt its commercial vehicles to meet specif-
ic Southeast Asian demand patterns, found itself restricted to
the price-inelastic demand of government institutions such as the
police or the army. As a result, regional turnover has been con-
2
fined to a few hundred vehicles per year .
Very similar arguments apply for large-scale engineering and
turnkey projects. Overseas manufacturers of key components had to
tie up with local or other suppliers for those parts and services
which they could not offer themselves at competitive prices. In
the eight countries under review, only those firms which adapted
their services and integrated the advantages of the international
devision of labour in their own organization and in each individ-
ual large-scale project have been able to remain price competit-
ive. Frequently, European headquarters have not been sufficiently
flexible or interested to follow this strategy. On the other
hand, there was a number of success stories of European engineer-
Thai trade channel analysis, product tables. Similar ratios
characterized the imports of tractors and parts and motor ve-
hicles.
2
Information from an interview with MAN delegates in Manila.- 97 -
ing companies and equipment suppliers which have followed this
principle . This attested to the competitive potential of Euro-
pean suppliers in this field.
In sum, the positioning of products in terms of pricing and prod-
uct adaptation appears to be a key element of Japanese marketing
strategies in the countries under review.
In contrast, European companies have generally been far more
reluctant to adapt products to specific local demand patterns and
have tended to concentrate on the top-price segment. This con-
firms again, that a certain lack of interest in the region on the
part of many European companies has been at the origin of their
competitive disadvantage in the area of marketing. The success of
a few European manufacturers which have followed marketing strat-
egies similar to those of most Japanese companies adds additional
weight to the view that the limited success of most European com-
panies in the markets under review is not only a sign of a de-
cline in general competitiveness of European companies, but also
the result of a certain neglect of marketing strategies in this
part of the world.
In the eight years from 1975 to 1983, Lurgi, the wholly-owned
subsidiary of Metallgesellschaft of the FRG, received 36 plant
orders from Southeast Asia in the areas of edible oil refining,
oil seed extraction and oil chemistry alone. In Malaysia, Lurgi
reportedly installed 65 per cent of the total edible oil refin-
ing capacity. See Horst Hartmann, "The edible oil industry in
South-east Asia", in Lurgi Information, 9, 1983, p. 37. In a
number of cases, Lurgi worked together with Japanese sogo
shosha. Coutinho Caro was another successful European company
in the field of large engineering projects, plant exports etc.
AEG and Klockner adopted the same "local content" strategy for
a number of contracts in Thailand. Information from interviews.- 98 -
6. Summary and conclusions
Marketing strategies in the sense of institutional export chan-
nels and the positioning of products within the final market
differ significantly between Japanese, European and United States
companies and these differences appear to be directly related to
the varying degrees of success of Japanese, European and United
States companies in developing Southeast and East Asia. These are
the two major results of the preceding analysis.
Judging on the basis of the available data, the export marketing
strategies of European manufacturers in the region under review
differed in four notable ways from those of their competitors.
First, the absolute amount and the share of exports to affiliated
manufacturing subsidiaries in total European exports to the re-
gion was significantly smaller than for Japanese or United States
exports. This coincided with the low level of European direct
investment in the region. Whereas Japanese and, to a lesser ex-
tent, United States manufacturers have established their own
captive markets in Asia, European manufacturers have been less
prepared to establish this type of export bridgeheads. This has
been a clear handicap considering that at least one quarter of
total imports and in many countries significantly more were han-
dled by foreign-affiliated manufacturers.
Second, numerous European manufacturers continued to rely on
European export and agency houses instead of up-dating their
export and distribution network. European agency houses have lost
most of their historical importance and are going through a pro-- 99 -
found structural crisis in most countries under review. In addi-
tion the conflicts of interest between principals and distri-
butors and the comparatively limited supervision of the agency
houses by their European principals, have often worked to the
latters' disadvantage. As a result, many European companies have
not been able to break away from the circle of considering the
markets under review as marginal, undertaking marginal marketing
efforts and thereby remaining in a marginal position.
Third, the declining role of the European agency houses stood in
sharp contrast to the key contributions of the Japanese sogo
shosha to the success of Japanese manufacturers in the region.
Japan's top nine general trading companies handled approximately
half of the region's bilateral trade with Japan and between 15
and 20 per cent of total trade of the countries under review.
They had accumulated substantial equity interests throughout the
modern sectors in Southeast Asia. Their unrivaled product, market
and functional diversification put them into a unique position as
two-way communicators and low-margin organizers for the whole
range of economic relations between Japan and the region under
review.
This readily available pipeline for trade, investment and techno-
logical cooperation put Japanese manufacturers, and in particular
small- and medium-size companies into an advantageous position
over their western competitors. Whereas United States companies
frequently benefited from the existence of a large and closely-
knit American expatriate business community as well as from the- 100 -
powerful political and military position of their home country,
European companies did not have any comparable business infra-
structure at their disposal.
Fourth, European manufacturers have primarily aimed at the top-
price segment of demand in contrast to their Japanese competitors
which have been far more skilful in positioning products in terms
of prices, product adaptation and distribution systems in the
large and fast growing transitional or even traditional market
segments.
One may summarize that European companies in the countries under
review have tended to opt for the easier alternatives: no repre-
sentation in the region rather than cooperation with local com-
panies, reliance on European agency houses rather than establish-
ing marketing affiliates, licensing rather than investing, and
positioning of products in the top-price top-quality market seg-
ment rather than adapting them in terms of product characteris-
tics and pricing. This reluctance to commit resources to the
development of the markets under review accounted for a major
part of the competitive disadvantages of European companies vis-
a-vis their Japanese and United States competitors in the field
of marketing. One may argue that there must have been other, more
lucrative markets including the EEC, itself, in which additional
marketing efforts yielded higher returns. The limited amount of
interest in Asia on the part of European companies, however,
appears to reflect, as well, some less rational elements. Many
European companies have underestimated the growth potential of- 101 -
the region, and they have seen the region primarily as a market
for final goods rather than participating on a broader basis in
the increasingly diversified economic potential of the region.
It follows that the declining role of European companies in the
region is related to their competitive disadvantages in the field
of marketing strategies in the broad sense. These disadvantages
have further aggravated the effects of the more generally-ob-
served decline in international competitiveness of European com-
panies.
Against this background, the further prospects for European com-
panies in this region are not entirely bleak. Redressing market-
ing strategies in the sense of making greater marketing commit-
ments in the region under review may be easier to achieve than
reversing a general decline of competitiveness in the field of
production and technical innovation. At the same time, however,
regaining lost market shares will become more difficult in the
future, as the peak of the region's economic growth lies in the
past.
The limited competitiveness of European companies in Asia in
terms of marketing leads to the question whether this is a unique
phenomenon of this region or applies to other markets, as well.
Although the data in the present study do not permit any compre-
hensive answer to this question, there are a few points worth
mentioning with respect to the four above-mentioned differences
in marketing strategies between European companies and their- 102 -
competitors. Japan's lead position as investor in Southeast and
East Asian developing countries is unique to this region. In
fact, Japanese direct investment flows to all developing coun-
tries were lower than those from the EEC or the United States, in
absolute terms as well as in relation to exports to developing
countries . Hence, United States companies and, to a lesser ex-
tent, European companies tended to have a clear edge over their
Japanese competitors in other parts of the developing world in
terms of affiliated, captive markets. Japanese companies, how-
ever, appear to be catching up, particularly in Latin America. By
1981, they had invested over US$ 3 billion in Latin America's
manufacturing sector, which was equivalent to one fifth of Ja-
2 pan's total overseas industrial investment . Similar to their
pronounced specialization on a fairly limited number of prod-
ucts , Japanese companies appear to have been quite selective in
their choice of overseas markets and investment locations.
From 1977 to 1981, Japanese direct investment flows to develop-
ing countries averaged at US$ 1.2 billion p.a., compared to 3.6
billion for the EEC (Belgium, Denmark, France, FRG, Italy,
Netherlands, U.K.) and 5.7 billion for the United States. In
relation to 1981 exports to developing countries, these invest-
ment flows amounted to 1.8 % for Japan, 2.9 % for the EEC and
6.8 % for the United States. United Nations Centre on Transna-
tional Corporations, Transnational Corporations in World Devel-
opment, Third Survey, ST/CTC/46, New York 1983, p. 297, and
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Handbook of
International Trade and Development Statistics, 1984 Supple-
ment, TD/STAT.12, New York 1984.
2 News from MITI, June 23, 1983, p. 6.
See for instance, Lawrence G. Franko, The threat of Japanese-
multinationals - How the West can respond, John Wiley & Sons,
Chichester, 1983.- 103 -
Also the role of European agency houses seems to be under less
pressure in other parts of the world than in Asia. According to
recent estimates, trading houses handled between 20 and 30 per
cent of exports in the FRG, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the
2 U.K. and Denmark . This was significantly more than the shares of
European agency houses in Asian imports from Europe. In many
African,countries, for instance, European agency houses continued
to play an important role in trade and other economic activities.
As far as Japan's general trading companies were concerned, their
activities were by no means confined to Asian countries. With
more than 1 000 overseas bases in 1981/82 the nine sogo shosha
were present all over the world and had established bridgeheads
for growing economic relations with Japan in practically all
developing countries.
With respect to the positioning of products in third markets in
terms of pricing and product adaptation, there was no data avail-
able on possible differences between European and Japanese com-
panies. Yet, there is little reason for assuming that Japanese
companies have abandoned a strategy in third markets, which has
yielded favourable results in Asia. The above-mentioned evidence
on the skilfulness of Japanese companies in the area of market
segmentation in the U.K. as well as the success of Japanese manu-
Erich Batzer, Rainer Ziegler, Die AuBenhandelsunternehmen in
der Europaischen Gemeinschaft: Funktionen, Strukturen,- Wettbe-
werb, Studie fur die Kommission der Europaischen.Gemeinschaf-
ten, IFO-Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, November 1984, p.
139 n. . , • . . • .- 104 -
facturers in specific product markets in Africa and Latin Amer-
ica suggest in fact, that the successful positioning of products
has been a general rather than a specifically Asian characteris-
tic of the activities of Japanese companies.
One may conclude that European companies in other parts of the
developing world are likely to have been in a stronger competi-
tive position in the field of marketing vis-ai-vis their Japanese
competitors than they were in Southeast and East Asia. The les-
sons from this region, however, deserve nevertheless to be taken
seriously.
Marie-Claude Chapon, Strategies des entreprises japonaises en
Afrique - consequences pour les entreprises fran^aises, Euro-
Asia Centre, INSEAD, Fontainebleau, September 1983, mimeo.- 105 -
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Appendix A: Marketing of OECD Exports of Raw Materials and Inter-
mediate Goods
Imports of raw materials such as petroleum, fertilizers or grain
are handled to B. large extent by government institutions or pub-
lic enterprises . Purchases are mostly done directly on the basis
of public tenders and increasingly on f.o.b. terms. Some of the
leading locally-owned manufacturers, as well, purchase raw mate-
rials and intermediate goods directly from abroad. These prod-
ucts, and in particular petroleum, account for a major share of
total imports of the countries under review. In the Republic of
Korea, for instance, 24.4 per cent of the total import bill in
1981 was paid for petroleum. As a result, the share of direct
imports by final users in, total imports accounted for an estimat-
ed 38.3 per cent in 1981 . This was significantly higher than in
the less resource-dependent countries of the region. In Malaysia,
locally-controlled manufacturing companies imported 13.5 per cent
of total imports in 1980 and in Thailand, the corresponding fig-
ure was 18.5 per cent for the 76 largest local manufacturing
companies .
Yet, exports of petroleum and other raw materials and interme-
diate products at early stages of processing play a minor role in
OECD country exports to the region, if one excludes United States
grain exports. In addition, these products compete primarily in
terms of prices owing to their comparatively high homogeneity.
The increased market transparency in these markets explains, why
suppliers generally do not need to establish their own marketing
network and why direct purchases by final users have become com-
mon. It follows that these products are less relevant for the
questions addressed in this paper.
Imports of foreign-affiliated manufacturing companies from non-
related sources have been another area, in which overseas sup-
pliers have sometimes been able to export without representation
in the target market. Traditional suppliers from the home coun-
tries have sometimes exported directly to these affiliates. Mar-
keting efforts of such suppliers were directed to the headquar-
ters rather than the Asian affiliates.
Government-owned Pernas Trading Sdn Berhad, for example, han-
dles reportedly half of Malaysia's urea and fertilizer imports.
Indonesia's Bulog imported in 1980/81 grain for US$ 1.1 bil-
lion. Other examples are the Office of Supply of the Republic
of Korea (Osrok) or the Central Trust of China in Taiwan. In-
formation from United Nations, International Trade Centre
UNCTAD/GATT, file on state trading corporations,
o
See United Nations, ESCAP/UNCTC Joint Unit on Transnational
Corporations, 1985, loc.cit., chapter V.
ibid, chapters III and IV.- 107 -
Manufacturers of highly specialized machinery and equipment have
also been contacted directly by final users or through interna-
tional trading companies, particularly in connection with pro-
jects financed by tied aid. In general, however, capital goods
exporters require local agents or delegates in Asian markets in
order to receive information on projects and tenders at an early
stage, in order to blend imported and local components in their
bids and in order to offer after-sales services.
One may conclude, that - with the exception of selected raw mate-
rials and intermediate goods at early stages of processing -
exporters to the region require some kind of local representation
in the final markets.
Appendix B: The Economics of Sogo Shosha
From the point of view of Japanese manufacturers, the attractive-
ness of the sogo shosha has been associated with the latters'
ability to bridge bottlenecks in export marketing all along the
dynamic process from market entry to overseas production or li-
censing. The textile industry is a prime example, partly because
some of the sogo shosha evolved from Osaka-based textile mer-
chants. After World War II, the sogo shosha were instrumental in
developing export market outlets for Japanese textile products,
as they had a near monopoly as far as knowledge of and contracts
in foreign markets were concerned. As Japan losts its comparative
advantage in the labour-intensive textile sector, largely due to
labour shortages in Japan, the major Japanese textile companies,
in close co-operation with the general trading companies of their
industrial groupings, built up manufacturing units all over
Southeast Asia. Toray Industries, the largest Japanese textile
manufacturer and core member of the Mitsui Group, invested in
each of the five ASEAN countries mostly together with Mitsui, but
also with Marubeni (Malaysia), Toyomenka (Philippines) and C.
Itoh (Singapore and Thailand). Toray's joint-ventures in Thailand
(Luckytex), Malaysia (Pen Group) and Indonesia (Century Textiles)
are among the largest textile units in the region. Similarly, the
sogo shosha established joint-ventures in the eight countries
under review with all the other major textile manufacturers such
as Toyobo, Kanebo or Mitsubishi Rayon. During the start-up period
of joint ventures, the sogo shosha contributed primarily through
market and feasibility studies, the arrangement of financing
schemes and their contacts and connections with governments and
the business community at large. At a latter stage, their assis-
tance was particularly crucial in times of transitions: a case in
point was the 1975 crisis of the Thai textile sector, when com-
panies had to shift from domestic market orientation to a more
outward looking approach.
The textile industry is by no means the only sector in the coun-
tries under review, into which the sogo shosha channeled Japanese
investment. Their joint-venture activities span the entire gamut
from the primary to the tertiary sector, reflecting closely the
structure of Japanese economic involvement in Southeast and East- 108 -
Asian developing countries. As may be gathered from Annex table
21, there were at least 404 joint-ventures of the sogo shosha in
the eight countries under review . Nearly two thirds of the joint
ventures were in the manufacturing sector, and - apart from tex-
tiles - primarily in metals and metal products, chemicals and
transportation equipment. Although the number of projects in the
primary sector was small, it included some of the region's larg-
est resource-based projects, which have been of tremendous impor-
tance to Japanese and non-Japanese suppliers of equipment, not to
mention Japanese raw material importers . Prime examples are the
US$ 2 billion Asahan aluminum project in Northern Sumatra, Maru-
beni's involvement in copper mining in the Philippines, Mitsu-
bishi's role in Brunei LNG Ltd. and numerous forestry projects in
Indonesia.
Sogo shosha affiliates in the tertiary sector were concentrated
in the two entrepot trade centres Hong Kong and Singapore.
The total registered capital of sogo shosha affiliates amounted
to US$ 1.5 billion. Assuming a debt-equity ratio of 5 to 1 the
total investment of their joint-ventures in the eight countries
under review would have been approximately US$ 9 billion}
More than two-thirds of the 404 sogo shosha affiliates were tri-
partite joint-ventures between a Japanese manufacturer, a local
partner in the host country and a sogo shosha. This, again, bears
witness to the catalytic role of the sogo shosha in enhancing
Japanese investment in developing Asia and in marching Japanese
investors with local partners in the host countries. The equity
share of the sogo shosha has normally been less than 30 per cent,
in exchange for which they reserved for themselves the right to
handle the imports and, to the extent available, exports of their
affiliates.
This is actually an underestimation, as the source of the table
is the most comprehensive but nevertheless incomplete source on
Japanese overseas investment. Host country data in Indonesia
puts the number of sogo shosha affiliates to 113 in 1981 (JETRO
Jakarta Centre), i.e. 50 per cent more companies.
2
See for instance Terutomo Ozawa, 'A newer type of foreign in-
vestment in Third-World resource development
1, in: Revista
Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali, Vol. XXIX,
No. 12, Dec. 1982, pp. 1133-1151.
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Japan, News from
MITI, 26 January 1981, p. 8, specifies this gearing for all


































Butter, cheese and curd
Cereal flours
Malt
Bean oils, palm oils and
coconut oils
Malt extract
Non-alcoholic essence for drinking
Spirits; liqueures etc.



















































































































Writing ink, printing ink and
other ink
Mixtures of odoriferous substances
Organic surface-active agents
Film in rolls





















Wood in the rough
Wood sawn lengthwise
Pulp derived by mech. or chem.
means from any fibrous vegetable
material
Waste paper and paper board
Paper and paper board in rolls
or sheets
Paper and paper board, impregnated,
coated surface-colour
Printed book etc.
5. TEXTILES AND TEXTILE PRODUCTS














































































Man-made fibres for spinning
Waste of man-made fibres
Knitted or crocheted fabric
Waste and strap metal of iron or
steel
Puddled bars and pilings or iron
or steel
Iron or steel coils for re-rolling
Angles, shapes and sections of
iron or steel
Hoop and strip or iron or steel
Sheets and plates or iron or steel
Alloy steel
Tubes and pipes of cast iron
Structures and parts of struc-
tures etc. of iron or steel
Stranded wire, cable cordage
etc. of iron or steel
Chain and parts thereof, of iron
or steel
Bolts and nuts etc. or iron or steel
Other articles of iron or steel
Copper
Wrought bars, rods, angles,
shapes and sections, of copper
Plates, sheet, strip, of copper
Aluminum waste and scrap
Lead waste and scrap
Zinc waste and scrap
Interchangable tools etc.
Locks and padlocks












































































Centrifuges for liquids or gases
Machinery for cleaning or drying
bottles or other containers
Lifting, handling, loading or
unloading machinery
Excavating, levelling, tamping,
boring and extracting machinery
Machinery used in food and
drink industries
Machinery for making or finishing




Machines for weaving,knitting etc.
Machine-tools for working metal
or metal carbides
Automatic data processing
machines and units thereof
Office machines, parts and
accessories
Machinery for sorting, screen-
ing, separating, washing etc.
Machines; having individual
functions
Moulding boxes for metal foundry
Taps, cocks, valves etc.





Tools for working in the hard,
with self contained electric motors
Electrical starting and ignition
equipment for internal combustion
engines
Electric instantaneous or
storage water heaters etc.





Electrical apparatus for making













































Thermionic, cold cathode and
photocathode valves etc.
Electrical appliances and apparatus
Insulated electrical wire & cable
Carbon brushes, arc-lamp carbon
Insulation























Special purpose motor carries
and vans
Chassis fitted with engines
Works trucks etc.






Parts or accessories etc.
Watches
Gramophones etc.
Cast, rolled, drawn or blown glass
Pearls, precious stones























7107Annex Table 2 - Example of Coimiodity Table of Thai Trade Channel Analysis



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: SurveyAnnex table 5 - Thai Imports (144 Major Products) by Trading Channel in 1980 (Value of Imports on Own Account in Bant millions - Percentage Share of Each Trading








































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Department of Business Economics, Ministry of Commerce, own calculations.
(56.9) 193,618
Total Thai ImoortsAnnex table 6 - Selected Imports of Thailand by 354 Major Importers by Countries of Origin and Import Channel - 1980
(Per cent)
Food & Ibbacco in Bant Million
Share of for. affil. agency houses
marketing affiliates
local trading companies





Mineral Products and Fuels in Baht
Million
Share of for. affil. agency houses
marketing affiliates
local trading companies





Chemical Products in Baht Million
Share of for. affil. agency houses
marketing affiliates
local trading companies





Wood, Wood Products % Paper in Baht
Million
Share of for. affil. agency nouses
marketing affiliates
local trading companies





Textile Products in Baht Million
Share of for. affil. agency houses
marketing affiliates
local trading companies




















































































































































































































100.0Annex table 6 continued
(Per cent)
Base Metals in Baht Million
Share of for. affil. agency houses
marketing affiliates
local trading companies





Machinery in Baht Million
Share of for. affil. agency houses
marketing affiliates
local trading companies




Transportation Equipment in Eaht Million
Share of for. affil. agency houses
marketing affiliates
local trading companies





Other in Baht Million
Share of for. affil. agency houses
marketing affiliates
local trading companies






a in Baht Million
Share of for. affil. agency houses
marketing affiliates
local trading companies

















































Including 144 major import products. - Including imports














































































































































































Source: As for Annex table 5.Annex table 7 - Thai Imports by Countries of Origin and Trade Channel, 1980





















































































































































































Source: Department of Business Economics, Ministry of Commerce; own calculations.Annex table 8 - Thai Imports by Countries of Origin and Trade Channel, 1980
(Percentage Share in Total Imports of Each Trade Channel)















































Annual growth rate of
Thai imports 1971-80







































































































































193,580.1Annex Table 9 - Index of the Average Size of Annual Import Transactions per Importer by Product Groups and Trade



















































































































































































































































































































































aThe 1969 data refers to all limited companies irrespective of their size. In 1976, only those companies were in-
cluded with revenue of M$ 1 million or more. In 1980, the survey covers only companies having M$ 5 million revenue
or more. The different sample sizes, however, hardly disturb, the picture, as the small companies excluded in 1976
and 1980 account for a very small share of total imports. - Exchange rates of the Malaysian Ringgit per US $ were
3.0612 by the end of 1969, 2.535 by the end of 1976 and 2.2224 by the end of 1980.
Source: Department of Statistics, Malaysia, Report on the Financial Survey of Limited Companies, Kuala Lumpur,






aLC: letter of credit. -
aggregated into I£-based
Sales by offer agents
- General offer agents
- Offer agents for own use







GTC's share for own use
Estimated amount Estimated Per-


























The imports of the general trading companies could only be dis-
and non-LC based imports.
Source; Calculation based on information from Korea Traders Association, Association
of Foreign Trading Agents of Korea and the Ministrv of Commerce and Industry
by Doo-Soon Ahn, Department of Economics, City College, Seoul.Annex table 12 - Household Possession by Average Monthly Household









































































Source; SRI, The Indonesian consumer cited from Marc Cunningham,
Marketing and distribution for multinational companies in
Indonesia: an overview, Euro-Asia Centre, INSEAD, Fon-
tainebleau, Research Paper No. 14, 1983, p. 23.Annex table 13 - Consumer Attitudes in Jakarta, 1980 (per cent)
I will go out of my way to find
a cheaper price.
I prefer to buy in a shop I
like even though the price may
be a little more expensive.
I buy brands I like even though
their prices may be a little more
expensive.
I always buy the cheapest brands.
I prefer to buy products that
are advertised.
It doesn't matter to me if a prod-
uct is advertised or not.
I like to read the ads in news-
papers and magazines.

































































Source: SRI, The Indonesian consumer cited from Marc Cunningham, Marketing and
distribution for multinational companies in Indonesia: an overview,
Euro-Asia Centre, INSEAD, Fontainebleau, Research Paper No. 14, 1983,
pp. 24, 56.Annex table 14 - Import Unit Price Indices





































































































































major import products (see note b)
countries of origin (EEC, Japan, United States
or other Asian countries)
value of annual imports of products j divided
by quantity of annual imports of product j.
Including the 104 major import products
geneitv within product categories).






















































































(machinery was excluded because of high product hetero-










































































































































































































(n=9)Annex table 16 - Import Unit Price Indices












































































































































































































(n=7)Annex table 17 - Import Unit Price Indices of Selected Thai Imports from Other Asian Developing Countries bv Product




































































































































































































.J + a, a18
USAij
with IP. . : average annual Import £rice of trade channel i for product i;
i = 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
(for key, see Annex table 5, 14, 15, 16 or 17)
k = 1, 2, ..., 144 except for products for which
IP.
IP





national average annual Import Price for product j
dummy variables for Trade Channel i (TC. = 1 for i = 1, TC. = 0 for i ^ 1; etc.)
average Annual Import Value per company for trade channel i and product j in 1000 Baht
JAP.. : share of imports from JAPan for trade channel i and product j
EEC. . : share of imports from the EEC for trade channel i and product i
USA.. : share of imports from the USA for trade channel i and product j
ASIA..: share of imports from other ASIAn countries for trade channel i and product i
There were 1017 observations.
Results:


























































































4.952*Annex table 19 - Bilateral Trade of Intermediate Goods and Final Goods of the ASEAN Countries and the Republic of Korea with
Japan, the USA, and the Best of the World, 1975 (in brackets exports of manufacturing companies from Japan,











































































































































































































































Source: Institute of Developing Economies, International Input-Output Table for ASEAN Countries, 1975, Tokyo 1982.Annex table 20 - Exports of Manufacturing Companies from Japan, the United States and the
Pest of the World to the Manufacturing Sectors of the ASEAN Countries and
the Republic of Korea, 1975
US$ millions
Intermediate goods Final goods
Japanese US rest of total Japanese US rest of total








































































830.2Annex table 21 - Joint Ventures of the Sogo Shosha in Southeast and East Asian Developing Countries by Type of Joint Venture and





























































































































































Source: Compiled from Toyo Keizai Weekly, Special Edition, Japanese Multinationals, Facts & Figures, 1982.